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Abstract 
 
Jason Adam Johnson 
Theory versus Practice: An analysis of the beliefs, strategies and practices of 
political consultants in a dynamic campaign environment 
(Under the direction of George Rabinowitz) 
 
 
  
 
This work focuses on the beliefs, strategies and practices of American political 
consultants. This analysis proposes to look at three main areas of modern political 
campaigns, negative advertising, candidate selection and candidate positioning, and 
compare existing political science theory in this areas to the results of a survey of 
political consultants actively working in the field. The results of this work show that 
many of the factors that political science theory suggests have a significant impact on 
campaign strategy, especially in the area of negative advertising, are not significant in the 
minds of consultants when they formulate and implement strategy. The work concludes 
with suggestions for improving political science knowledge of consultants as well as 
implications of this research.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Political campaigns are one of the most studied and analyzed areas in political 
science. Arguably, everything from the behavior of members of congress on legislation to 
the implementation of policy on the state level stems from how elections are run, 
managed and perceived by the public (Mayhew 1974, Randon Hershey 1984; Johnson, 
Cartee – Copeland 1997; Thurber, Nelson and Dulio 2000; Nelson Dulio and Medvic 
2002, Sabato 2006). However, one aspect of the political process that has thus far 
received short shrift in political analysis is the political consultant, the individuals behind 
many aspects of modern day campaigns. While some political scientists have argued that 
new more empirical theory and study should be focused on campaigns and campaign 
theory, political consultants, the actual practitioners of campaign politics are still often a 
missing part of the equation ( Johnson-Cartee – Copeland 1997, Thurber 1998; Jamieson 
and Waldman 2001; Craig 2006). Arguably, the current state of political science work on 
consultants is akin to having a large literature on policy outcomes but little or no research 
on the attitudes and beliefs of the members of Congress who create the policy. It is the 
goal of this dissertation to initiate an analysis of political consultant’s attitudes, beliefs 
and behaviors and how they relate to existing theories in political science on campaigns.  
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The purely political science literature on political consulting and campaign 
management is limited, in large part because much of the original works were not done 
by political scientists but actually former and current campaign professionals (Perry 
1968, Pritchell 1958) . The first works were written as professional histories focusing 
primarily on what ‘political consulting’ was, and how some intrepid businesses and 
individuals were beginning to assist in the campaign process (Shaddeg, 1960; Kirwan, 
1964; Shadegg, 1964; Kirwan and Redding 1964; Scott 1968). Again, most of this work 
focused on political professionals and very few works were written by trained political 
scientists although occasionally works were written by members of the business 
academia (Ross and Baus, 1968) 
 The 1970’s saw the advent of books discussing the profession of political 
campaigning as opposed to just the personal case study histories of certain managers. 
Much of this work sought to establish exactly what political consulting was, and what 
would be the nomenclature of these new political entrepreneurs. They were described as 
the campaign managers (Nimmo 1970), implementers of campaign strategy (Parkinson, 
1970; Shadegg, 1972; Napolitan,1972) and generally seen as organizers. By and large the 
1970’s literature spoke to the increasing professionalization of the field of political 
campaigning (Wilson 1966; Nimmo 1970; Hiebert et. al 1971; Rosenbloom 1973). It 
would not be until the next decade that the impact of this new profession started to 
receive serious analysis in political science.  
 Through the work primarily of Larry Sabato (1983; 1987; 1989 and 1989) and 
Paul Herrnson (1986; 1988 and 1989; 1989) the impact of political consultants was 
beginning to be noticed in political science, coinciding with discussions of the decline of 
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party influence and the increasing money required to run for public office (Blumenthal 
1980, p. 1; Paying for Elections, 1989; and Campaigns & Elections 1989; Salmore and 
Salmore, 1989; Petracca, 1989) In addition, during this era the first surveys of political 
consultants on a large scale (Herrnson 1988) as well as the first survey of public attitudes 
towards political managers (Petracca 1989) were conducted for purely research and 
academic purposes.  
The next major era of consultant literature began in the 1990’s and ran into the 
early part of the new century. This era of consultant research coincided with an explosion 
in the public role that political consultants began to play in American politics.  With 
popular political consultants working as pundits, commentators and authors, their own 
personal and political lives became not only a part of campaign politics but popular and 
political culture in general. For most of the 1990’s and early 2000’s there was an increase 
in the focus on campaign politics, both in popular culture with movies like “The War 
Room” (1992); “Wag the Dog” (1997), “Primary Colors” (1998) and “Bullworth” (1998) 
and a spate of personal memoirs and semi-academic books on campaigning strategy and 
politics. (Matalin & Carville 1994; Carville 1996; Morris 1999; Perlmutter 1999; Strother 
2003; Moore & Slater 2003; Bailey, Faucheux, Herrnson, Wilcox, 2000; Watson and 
Campbell, 2003). However, the amount of disciplinary based scholarship work that 
focused on political consultants during this time was still fairly sparse (Kolodny and 
Logan 1998; Thielen and Wilhite 1998; Novotny 2000). Moreover while there was some 
work on consultants as a profession, political managers were still not being connected to 
existing theories and strategy in any meaningful way.  
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 In 1998, James Thurber of the Center of Congressional and Presidential Studies at 
American University let out the clarion call for aggressive and empirical work on 
political consulting. In his aptly titled article “The Study of Campaign Consultants: A 
Subfield in Search of a Theory” (1998) Thurber throws down the proverbial gauntlet to 
political science to investigate further this key part of the discipline. 
 “Though professional political consulting outside of political party organizations has 
 been around since the 1930’s, it has only recently sparked interest among some political 
 scientists. Why have consultants been ignored by political scientists? Why have 
 consultants ignored political scientists? Why is there little or no theory related to 
 political consultants? Why do we know so little about the profession of political 
 consultants? What subfield houses the study of political consulting?: Elections and 
 voting behavior, political parties, political communications, political advertising, 
 campaign management?” (Thurber 1998; p. 1)  
The argument can be made that now, almost 10 years after this critical article, 
political science does know a little more about political consultants as a whole, a cottage 
industry of sorts has arisen based on the work of a few key researchers, many of whom 
spring from the research center of Thurber (Thurber & Nelson 2000; Thurber 2001; 
Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000; Nelson, Dulio and Medvic 2002; Alterman 2003; 
Rampton and Stauber 2004). However, much of this research still fails to connect the 
consultant to political science and general consultant strategy. While the discipline is 
certainly more capable of answering questions about campaign ethics, and consultant 
business practices today than before Thurber’s call, critical questions such as consultant 
views on negative advertising, candidates and even policy positions still remain largely 
untouched.  
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This dissertation seeks to remedy the existing gap in political science literature on 
political consultants, in particular in regards to critical strategies and theories about 
campaign strategy. Advancements in political science analysis often spring from using 
new data sets to examine existing theories and concepts. New data on public viewing 
patterns changes analyses of campaign advertising strategy, National Election survey data 
is used to re-examine candidates every election year, and new congressional voting 
pattern data changes our views of candidate positioning. Much of campaign positioning 
work in political science is based on examining data from Congressional voting behavior 
and public voting patterns and applying that to existing theories. This analysis proposes 
to take this same method of advancement in political science and apply it to discover 
greater information about political consultants. This analysis will survey political 
consultants to discover their beliefs relating to existing theories in political science on 
campaigns. Not only will this research advance our knowledge of political campaigns in 
general, but will hopefully be a step towards greater understanding of political 
consultants as independent and crucial actors in American politics.  
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
  
 Political consultants’ attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors towards election campaigns 
are important to study because these consultants influence how a candidate behaves and 
the overall strategy of political campaigns.  In this dissertation, three major aspects of 
political campaigns, candidate traits, negative advertising and ideological positions of the 
candidates were selected to examine consultants’ attitudes, beliefs and behaviors and 
relationships to various predictors.  The importance of these three areas is well 
documented in both academic and professional campaign literature (Baus and Ross 1968; 
Blumenthal 1980; Salmore and Salmore 1989; Johnson 2000; Bailey, Faucheux, 
Herrnson and Wilcox 2000; Nelson et. al 2002). Research on consultants themselves is 
somewhat limited, in particular studies based on surveys of political consultants 
(Herrnson 1988; 1992 and Thurber 1999), none of which are focused on in-campaign 
strategy and attitudes.    
 This chapter is organized by the three political campaign areas.  The “Candidate 
Traits” section reviews the research literature for five candidate traits; the relationships of 
candidate traits with various predictors; and differences in candidate traits for 
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campaigning compared to governing.  The “Negative Ads” section reviews definitions for 
negative advertising and factors that predict the use and content of negative advertising.  
The “Candidate Positioning” section analyzes what existing models in political science 
best describe the positioning strategies of political candidates and the factors that predict 
the importance of issues and what position candidates take during a race. 
Candidate Traits  
 No previous analyses of political consultants have actually looked at what 
consultants consider to be important attributes in the candidates that they work for, or for 
candidates in general (Herrnson (1988); Thurber (1999)).  However, political scientists 
have long assessed how voters evaluated political candidates using a series of traits 
established in the American National Election Survey that is conducted during major 
election years in the United States (Kinder, 1985, 1992). The four major traits upon 
which voters have evaluated political candidates are “Empathy,” “Competence,” 
“Leadership” and “Integrity.”  Various political scientists have studied these four traits 
and attempted to assess what predictors if any have a significant effect on how these traits 
are viewed, or if the increase or decrease in any predictor influences the direction of 
feeling towards these traits (Keeter 1987; Alexander and Andersen 1993; Funk 1996, 
1997, 1999; Fox and Smith 1998; Hayes 2005).   
Along with the four traits listed above, there is an additional trait, “Ambition,” 
that is critical to analyze in this research. While political scientists have occasionally 
studied the political ambition of candidates for office (Mezey 1970; Rohde 1979; 
Terrelonge-Stone 1980; Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1987; Constantini 1990; 
Schlesinger 1991; Fox and Lawless 2005), no research has been done on political 
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consultant’s attitudes towards the ambitions of their candidate. Arguably, political 
consultants should be very concerned that the candidate that they work for actually has 
ambition to seek office and campaign since that attitude is directly related to their ability 
to be successful as consultants (Dickerson, Jan 22nd, 2008, Slate.com).  
The political science literature has shown that certain predictors may influence 
how a trait is viewed by a potential voter.  The major models in Table 1 provide a general 
outline of the effects of several major predictors on the importance of candidate traits 
when evaluating candidates. This is by no means a complete listing of all political science 
work on traits, but includes significant works that represent general trends and 
conclusions in political science on candidate traits. The most consistent result is that 
context matters, whether it is the election year, the district, or the political events 
occurring at the time of the campaign, the evaluation of traits is often influenced by many 
outside factors and they are not assessed by voters in a vacuum. Each of these predictors 
is discussed in turn. 
Party.  Partisanship seems to play a critical role in the evaluation of candidate 
traits, with the campaign context often influencing how partisanship interacts with such 
traits (Stoker 1993, Goren 2002, Klein & Ahluwalia 2005). In many cases, studies only 
focused on the traits of candidates in specific election years.  For example, Alvazrez and 
Glasgow (1998) found that while Democrats evaluated Clinton high on all traits, and 
Republicans evaluated Dole high on all traits, leadership was most important to 
Democrats in evaluating Clinton while Integrity and Leadership mattered equally in 
evaluating Dole amongst Republicans. Similar results were found in Klein and 
Ahulawa’s (2005) work where they found that for strong Republican and Democratic 
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partisans, Bill Clinton received somewhat different ratings on candidate traits. Democrats 
weighed Clinton’s intelligence and empathy very high in their final vote evaluations 
while strong Republican partisans rated him very low in intelligence but about equal to 
Democrats in empathy.  
Hansen and Otero (2007) found not only was partisanship the best predictor of 
how people will vote but also a stronger predictor of the weight placed on candidate 
traits. Leadership and Compassion seemed to be the most important traits to both parties 
from 1988 to 2004, with the candidate rated highest in one or both of those categories by 
Democratic and Republican partisans usually winning the day. This suggests that 
partisanship might not only matter as an individual predictor on the candidates but that 
the partisan leanings of a district might come into play as well.  
All of these works more or less confirm the research of Funk (1999) who argues 
that major candidate traits must be decoupled and studied separately because the 
campaign context can influence how different traits are evaluated (see also Goren 2002 
and Doherty and Gimpel 1997). In general it appears that the traits of Empathy and 
Leadership are the two most important traits in candidate evaluation especially to strong 
partisans for each party.  
While those traits rise to levels of importance in most campaign contexts, there 
are differences in how they are perceived by different parties.  Republicans tend to weigh 
leadership more heavily when evaluating the quality of a candidate and Democrats tend 
to look more at Empathy. The other major traits according to Kinder (1980) and Funk 
(1999) (Competence and Integrity) tend to vary in importance depending on the 
candidates running and the electoral context (Goren 2002, Hansen and Otero 2007). Only 
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Colleau et. al (1990) seemed to find that partisanship was not the strongest predictor in 
the difference of how a candidate’s general traits were evaluated, which was due, in large 
part, to the candidate’s race being a more influential than party in how traits were 
evaluated.   
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Table 1 
Predictors of Candidate Traits 
 
 
Study 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Predictor 
 
Results 
Goren 2002 Evaluation of 
Candidate  
Partisanship, Incumbent or 
Challenger  
GOP cares less about empathy than DEMs; DEMs care less about 
leadership than GOP, incumbents judged on weakest trait, especially 
from opposing party supporters  
Stoker 1993 Evaluation of 
Gary Hart after 
1988 Scandal  
Partisanship, Education/Voter 
Sophistication  
Strong partisans evaluated Gary Hart’s morality less importantly than 
opposition or weak partisans, More sophisticated weak partisans cared 
more for competence than integrity morality  
Klein & 
Ahluwalia 2005 
Feelings toward 
candidate positive 
of negative 
Partisanship  
Negative feelings 
Rating of candidate on traits  
Strong supporter of a candidate evaluates opposition on traits they are 
weakest on; not a strong supporter weighs candidate traits for both 
candidates similarly   
Funk 1999 Candidate 
preference 
Partisanship, Challenger or 
Incumbent  
Different candidates are evaluated on difference traits, depending on 
campaign context. So each predictor may have an impact but not in 
every campaign.   
Kinder et. Al 
1980  
Evaluation of 
Candidates  
Education/political 
sophistication, concept of ideal 
president, evaluation of traits   
Candidates not judged equally on all traits;  more educated voters more 
importance placed on competence – less educated more on empathy; 
ideal view of president only affects how incumbents are evaluated  
Arnold and 
Hawkins 2002 
Candidate 
electoral success 
Open-Seat, Challenger, 
Minority Population in District, 
Position being Sought, 
Campaign expenditures  
From 1970’s to 1990’s percentage of minorities in district has increased 
in likelihood of candidate being elected for Democrats, also affects how 
campaigns are run, In open seat races candidate money matters more, 
and all traits are more important since no incumbent  
Rapoport, 
Metcalf & 
Hartman 1989 
Direction of 
inferences  
Ratings of candidate traits, 
Issues candidate stands for  
Voters more likely to infer from issues to traits than vice versa; voter 
assessment of traits have low correlation to actual policy views of 
candidates, candidates rated high in compassion/empathy voters infer 
most about their issue positions  
Sanbonmatsu 
2002 
Candidate 
preference 
Voter beliefs about Gender 
traits, Issue positions, 
Partisanship 
Voters with stereotypes about women are likely to question women 
candidate’s competence, Democrats slightly prefer women candidates, 
campaigns that focus on women issues – women do better 
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Table 1, continued 
Predictors of Candidate Traits 
 
 
Study 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Predictor 
 
Results 
Alvarez & 
Glasgow 1998 
Evaluation of 
candidate, positive or 
negative  
Race, Gender, Education/ 
political sophistication, Party 
Identification, Challenger or 
incumbent 
The more sophisticated and certain of candidate traits the more positive 
the evaluation, less certain less favorable, Candidates perceived as 
having low Integrity or Leadership are evaluated lower than others, 
Challengers are judged more on competence than incumbents  
Alexander 2006 Number of women on 
CA City Councils  
Gender, minorities in district  Traits being equal, women are less likely to run for office than men, 
Minority population does not affect rate of women being elected 
Clayton and 
Stallings 2000 
Electoral success black 
women candidates 
(case study)  
Race, Gender, Money raised by 
candidate  
Black candidate are often judged more on competence by white voters 
and assumed to be less competent, more on empathy from black voters, 
more money better chance of election  
Hansen and 
Otero 2007 
Vote Choice post 9/11  Gender, Partisanship  
Post 9/11 voting 
Women candidates expected to be more empathetic and empathy 
mattered more, Partisanship more important in trait evaluation than 
gender, importance of leadership lessened since 9/11 especially in 
women candidates  
Gimpel 1997 Candidate Preference Partisanship, Race, Political 
sophistication/education, 
gender, Ideology 
Race, Ideology, Gender and concern for economic issues all influenced 
“Trust/Integrity” evaluation of candidates at different times in 
campaign, timing of assessment and individual candidate (Clinton, 
Bush and Perot) affect trait assessment 
Miller and 
Miller 1975 
Candidate Evaluation Race, Region Blacks rate Kennedy high and Wallace low, care about ideological 
integrity and concerns for themselves (empathy), explains drift from 
Democrats in 1960’s, Southerners vary importance of traits depending 
on candidate  
Pierce 1993 Candidate Preference  Political 
sophistication/education 
 
The more politically sophisticated the voter the more important 
competence is in candidate evaluation, less sophisticated more integrity 
matters – Leadership and Empathy are important across all types  
Burden 2002 Chances of being 
elected president from 
U.S. Senate  
Recent or current Senate 
incumbent, Race, Gender, 
position sought  
Women, Minorities seen as not having traits needed to be president, 
Running from Legislative position to executive position (Senate to 
President) is harder than executive to executive  
Colleau, Glynn 
et. al 1990 
Evaluation of black 
candidates by white 
voters  
Race of candidate, education of 
voters, partisanship, region  
White voters are more likely to question competence and integrity of 
black candidates, but strong character traits may dull anti-black 
attitudes, issues and partisanship may be more important in some cases  
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Type of Race (Challenger, Open Seat, or Incumbent). There are three ways in 
which a candidate starts a race: they are either seeking an open seat, they are challenging 
the current seat holder, or they are the incumbent defending their seat. Depending on 
what position one is in, political science research has shown that how traits are evaluated 
can change significantly. Initially, Funk (1999) argues that it is individual candidates that 
matter, and her research shows that there are no specific effects for incumbents or 
challengers, but there can be effects for specific candidates like Bob Dole or Bill Clinton. 
However Kinder et al (1980) demonstrated that there are differing trait evaluations based 
on incumbency. He found that on key traits such as Integrity and Leadership, voters 
evaluated the incumbent first, and often more harshly than the challenger. Continuing 
along this theme Alvarez and Glasgow (1998) suggest that evaluations of the ability to 
get things done, or competence, fall more heavily on challengers than incumbents, in part 
because voters have already had the chance to evaluate the incumbent’s competence on 
key issues. Goren (2002) as well concluded that mixed with partisan bias, a challenger’s 
weakness amongst key traits was weighted differently than an incumbent’s weakness on 
key traits. Arnold and Hawkins (2002) find that in the case of open seat races, candidate 
trait evaluations are based on the unique campaign circumstances, and therefore it is 
difficult to predict which traits will weigh more heavily on voters’ minds.  
Finally, in addition to what kind of position a candidate is in at the beginning of 
the race, the position they seek, be it a legislative or executive, can influence how their 
competence is viewed as well as their leadership ability (Neimi et. al 1995; Burden 2002; 
Atkeson and Partin 2001; Arnold and Hawkins 2002).   Atkeson and Partin (2001) find 
that voters view the responsibilities and competencies of Gubernatorial and Senatorial 
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candidates differently. Whereas Governors are seen as being more caring about and 
responsible for the poor, Senators are seen as more likely to take strong leadership and 
stands on international issues. Burden’s (2002) work discusses the difficulties facing 
Senate candidates in their pursuit of the Whitehouse in part due to how they are evaluated 
differently on traits and issues from those running from executive positions. There is 
evidence to suggest that since those seeking and serving in executive positions are 
viewed and evaluated differently than those serving in and seeking legislative positions 
that the traits upon which they are evaluated would differ as well.  
While the political science research thus far has not presented any traits upon 
which all challengers or all incumbents or open-seat races are evaluated, there are 
tentative conclusions as to the influences of these differing campaign positions. 
Challengers and Incumbents are not evaluated equally on traits, and in some cases the 
campaign context, or the individual candidates may override the importance of candidate 
position (incumbent, challenger etc.) in how traits are evaluated.  
Gender.  Most political science research on gender and candidate traits focuses 
on the degree to which either the gender of the candidate or the voter influences how 
certain traits are evaluated. In many cases this is evaluated through vote choice, and in 
some cases while specific traits are not mentioned, some studies have shown that there is 
no consistent discernable difference in the likelihood of voters choosing female 
candidates compared to male candidates (Darcy and Schramm 1977; Eckstrand and 
Eckert 1981). However, most recent studies come to a different conclusion; gender plays 
a unique role in trait evaluation, while also mixing in the influence of specific candidate 
issues. For example, Rosenwasser et. al (1987) found that women were deemed as highly 
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‘competent’ on ‘feminine’ issues such as education and civil rights while they were 
evaluated as being less competent on issues such as foreign affairs and the military. 
Sanbonmatsu (2002) found similar results in that female candidates were found to be 
generally more empathetic than men, and that empathy also played a larger role in how 
they were evaluated by voters. Further, that while women were found to be just as 
competent as men, this evaluation varied according to what issues were placed before the 
public. Thus women candidates who focused on a few issues that were seen as their 
inherent strengths may actually be more successful than male candidates (Clayton and 
Stallings 2000, Hansen and Otero 2007). Continuing on this theme, women candidates’ 
traits are also more positively evaluated for certain positions more than men. Hedlund et 
al (1979), Huddy and Terkilson (1993) and Alexander (2006) find that women candidates 
are found to be more competent when seeking legislative positions, such as for the school 
board or city council, as opposed to more ‘leadership’ oriented positions as judge or 
mayor.  
Since the vast majority of political candidates running for high office are men 
(governor, president) sometimes gender plays a role in trait evaluation from the 
demographics of the voter not the candidate. Doherty and Gimpel (1997) found that 
women tended to trust Bill Clinton more than George Bush across the board, especially 
on economic issues and despite knowledge of his extra-martial affairs.  Alvarez and 
Glasgow (1998) found similar results with Clinton leading both Dole and Perot in both 
leadership and integrity across the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections, but men found 
Clinton’s leadership less impressive.  
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In summary, how male and female candidates are viewed on key traits appears to 
be a mixed result in the current literature. While women can be evaluated just as 
positively as male candidates in general, unlike men, they appear to be limited in the 
realms to which they are positively evaluated. Women are generally seen as less able to 
demonstrate leadership than male candidates, and yet across the other key traits of 
integrity, empathy and competence women fare as well if not better than their male 
counterparts depending on the campaign context.  
 Race. Both the race of the candidate and the race of the voters have an impact on 
how candidates and candidate traits are evaluated. The research suggests that white voters 
tend to have harsher evaluations of black candidates, rating them lower on traits such as 
competence and leadership depending on the campaign environment and the policies 
being presented. (Colleau, Glynn etc. al, 1990; Wright 1995; Hajnal 1999; Jeffries 2002, 
Burden 2002; Liu 2003; and Abranjo 2005). This general negative affect towards black 
candidates in particular can be lessened if the candidate focuses on certain issues, or has 
already been able to establish their competence via previously held office or being an 
incumbent (Colleau et al 1990; Gimpel 1997; Hajnal 1999; Clayton and Stallings 2000).  
Continuing with the importance of race in trait evaluation the number and voting 
behavior of minority voters in a district can also impact the degree to which certain traits 
are focused on. In most cases when dealing with African American voters, it is difficult 
to find large samples of black voters in the last several decades that aren’t pre-disposed 
towards the Democratic candidate, (Miller and Miller 1975, Tate 1994; Lublin 1999).  
However, some studies have shown that black and minority voters weigh some traits 
more heavily than others. Alvarez and Glasgow (1998) and Doherty and Gimpel (1997) 
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found that black voters tended to trust Clinton more than Dole, and found him more 
competent and likely to accomplish things even when political sophistication was taken 
into account. Latino votes as well have been found to have unique evaluations of 
candidates and those seeking office that often differ from the white majority and 
occasionally from African Americans (Alvarez and Badola 2003; Leal 2004) Minorities 
in a district also affect how traits are evaluated. A large or small minority population in a 
campaign district can affect which traits a candidate focuses on, what issues they bring to 
the table and in some cases which candidates are more likely to be elected (Alexander 
2006; Arnold and Hawkins 2002; Burden 2004). 
 In summary, it would appear that race does play a role in how candidate traits are 
perceived, both from the perspective of the voters and from the perspective of the 
candidates themselves. While existing stereotypes about minorities and women might 
influence what traits a candidate is perceived to posses, the population of the district they 
are running in may equally influence whether these traits are viewed in a positive or 
negative light.  
 Education. Research on trait evaluation has led to the discovery of several other 
potential predictors, some dealing exclusively with voters and others dealing with the 
campaign environment. In general political sophistication plays a major role in how 
candidates are evaluated.  In some cases political sophistication is simply measured as 
education level (Kinder 1980; Alvarez and Glasgow 1998; Gimpel et al.) and in other 
cases was measured as an actual amount of political interest or knowledge (Pierce 1993; 
Goldthwaite 2002). Regardless of the measurement, there seemed to be a general 
consensus that the more sophisticated the voter, the more heavily they weighed a 
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candidates’ competence, and the less sophisticated the voter the more they focused on the 
candidate’s empathy or integrity. The importance of leadership seemed to vacillate with 
particular candidates and campaign year (Kinder 1980; Pierce 1993; Doherty and Gimpel 
1997; Alvarez and Glasgow 1998; Goldthwaite 2002; Bartels 2002).  
 Fundraising. The amount of money that a candidate can raise, or that they 
believe the opposition could raise has been shown to have a significant impact on 
campaign outcomes. (Jacobson 1978; Stonecash 1988; Squire and Wright 1990; Herrnson 
1992; Clayton and Stallings 2000, Heberlig 2003; Stone et. al 2004).  Stone et. al (2004) 
found that incumbents who were able to raise great sums of money were evaluated as 
stronger overall candidates on many traits and could deter potential challengers. Along 
the same lines Squire and Wright (1990) found that successful fundraising for non-
incumbent challengers was dependant on the size of campaigns districts and ultimately 
led to candidate success.  Herrnson (1992) found that more professional campaigns raised 
more money, and congressional candidates were viewed better.  Finally, Heberlig (2003) 
found that fundraising has an impact on the long term political ambitions and success of 
candidates once in office. Ultimately it would appear that the ability to raise funds can 
impact how a candidate can get out their message, their ideas and even their voters on 
election- day. While previous literature has already linked fundraising to candidate 
ambition while running or governing (Heberlig 2003) it is also possible that other traits 
such as competence, or even leadership could be influenced by how much a consultant is 
able to raise for their candidate and how. Therefore the amount of money that a candidate 
has compared to the competition will be evaluated to determine if this influences how 
consultant’s look at candidate traits.  
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Governing vs Campaigning.  In his seminal work, Congress: The Electoral 
Connection (1974), David Mayhew argued that legislator’s primary motivation in all 
activities was to be re-elected. In claiming that all legislators are ‘single minded seekers 
of re-election’, he detailed how this primary focus affected everything from the policies 
initiated to the structure of Congress itself and suggested the major conflict between 
voters and elected officials (and by extension political consultants) was the tension 
between governing and campaigning. Consultants want candidates who exhibit traits 
needed to get elected whereas voters seek candidates with traits to be good elected 
officials and as Mayhew suggested years ago, these traits and motivations may not 
overlap. This is compounded by the fact that consultants, especially for elite (federal, 
national) campaigns, seldom live and work exclusively in the same geographical area, 
and consequently may not care about the actual governing of the candidate since they 
likely will not have to live under the consequences.  
In one of the few prior consultant surveys conducted by James Thurber (1999) 
found that consultants often did actually regret helping to get candidates elected if they 
later found out that those candidates did not serve well.  “Almost 51% of all consultants 
said that they have helped a candidate get elected only to regret it later….Overall this 
indicates that many consultants who helped elect a candidate they were later sorry to see 
serve felt that way because their candidate seemingly pandered to voters, and told the 
public what they wanted to hear, instead of what the candidate intended to do….Our 
analysis demonstrates that consultants are not pleased to see a client elected at any cost. 
Indeed consultants hope their candidates truly mean what consultants help them to say.” 
(Thurber, Campaigns and Elections, May 2000, p. 2).  
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Further some works by consultants have suggested that this difference in skills 
sets may actually have electoral consequences. Jim Jordan, John Kerry’s campaign 
manager during the 2004 presidential campaign commented that, “John’s not an 
instinctive politician. He doesn’t understand the rhythms of a campaign. He’s a very 
gifted man in ways that are more analogous to being a good president than a good 
campaigner.” (p. 14, Thomas, 2004)  
Even if we were to accept the notion that consultants do care one way or another 
about how a candidate may eventually serve it does not change the fact that the attributes 
needed to run a successful campaign may or may not automatically mesh with what it 
takes to serve in office. Obviously with presidential campaigns starting earlier and earlier 
we have entered the era of the permanent campaign where the lines between serving in 
office and running are blurred (Jones, Brookings Review, Winter 2000, Vol. 18, No.1, 
pp. 12-16 and Tenpas, PSOnline 2003). Nevertheless it remains an interesting question as 
to what if any differences there are in a campaigner rather than a governor.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 Major predictors of candidate traits from the preceding review of the research 
literature are used to develop research questions and hypotheses of relationships with 
political consultants’ ratings of the importance of these traits.  Each predictor will be 
analyzed in multivariate models to control for other variables.  
 Research Question #1: What traits do consultants find important in the 
candidates that they work for?  
Hypothesis #1: There will be a difference in what traits are  rated as important by 
consultants based on the partisan identification of the consultant.  
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Research Question #2: Do political consultants see a relationship between the attributes 
needed for a candidate to campaign and the attributes needed for a candidate to govern?  
Hypothesis #2: The majority of political consultants will see a positive relationship 
between how candidates campaign and how they will eventually govern.  
Research Question #3: What relationship do the major predictors from the literature 
have on candidate trait evaluations while running or serving?   
Hypothesis #3: The following table lists the predicted relationships between predictors 
and candidate trait evaluations when running or governing.  
Table 2 
Hypotheses for Significant Predictors by Candidate Trait Model for Analysis 
 
Model 
 
Significant Predictors 
Interpretation: Trait Very 
Important if 
Integrity while running Type of Race  
Race  
Win – Lose  
WarChest  
Running as a Challenger  
Candidate is racial minority  
Candidate Lost  
Candidate has less money  
Integrity while governing Race  Candidate is racial minority  
Empathy while running Gender  Candidate is female  
Empathy while governing Gender  Candidate is male  
Leadership while running Type of Race  
Position Sought  
 
Party  
 
Candidate running as incumbent  
Candidate is running for executive 
position  
Candidate is Republican  
Leadership while governing Party  
District Preference  
Candidate is Republican  
District leans Republican  
Ambition while running Type of Race 
 
Gender  
Win – Lose  
Candidate running as Open Seat or 
Challenger  
Candidate running is female  
Candidate Won  
Ambition while governing None   
Competence while running Race 
Gender 
Party  
Education  
Candidate is racial minority 
Candidate is Female 
Candidate is Republican 
District is highly educated  
Competence while governing  Minority Percentage  
 
Education 
District has high minority 
percentage  
District is more educated  
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Negative Ads  
 In political science the study of negative ads, or attack ads, has been focused on 
two main areas of research, the implementation (Hale et. al 1996; Thielen and Wilhite 
1998; Thurber et. al 2000; West 2005) and the effect (Biocca 1991; Wayne and Wilcox 
1992; Kahn and Geer 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Wattenberg and Brians 
1999; Lemert et. al 1999; Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Hughes 2003; Stevens 2005). In 
their effective review of the major methodologies of negative advertising research (Kaid 
and Holtz-Bacha 2006) demonstrate that most negative advertising research is done 
through content analysis of ads, experiments, and simple surveys, though the majority of 
these surveys are done with regular voters, or even undergraduate students. Little survey 
work on negative advertising in political campaigns is done with actual creators or 
purveyors of negative ads as part of the research model. This section proposes to analyze 
the definition and the implementation of negative advertising in political campaigns and 
the circumstances that predict the use of negative advertising in political campaigns. 
 One of the reasons that negative advertising remains an interesting and yet fairly 
inconclusive area in political science is because there are few if any operational 
definitions of what actually constitutes negative advertising. In fact, the majority of 
political science literature on negative advertising fails to provide any actual definition of 
negative or attack advertising. Some of the most seminal works in negative advertising 
research actually do not have definitions of what negative or attack advertising is, but 
simply continue with their research as if the definition is a given. (Geer, 2006; Theilmann 
and Wilhite, 1998; Schultz and Pancer 1997; Hale, Fox and Farmer, 1996; Ansolabehere 
et. al 1994). Given that negative advertising is said to influence everything from voter 
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turnout, (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995), to voter information (Stevens 2005) to 
partisan polarization (Iyengar 2006) and voter cynicism (Kolodny, Dulio and Thurber 
2000, C&E 2000), it is problematic that so little work has been done on finding a 
consistent definition of the phenomenon.  
  The actual lack of definition for negative advertising in political science literature 
is seldom addressed, and when it is in practice, more often than not the failure to provide 
a clear definition is blamed on practitioners:  “Not surprisingly, most journalists and 
political practitioners do not define the term (negative advertising) explicitly, but the 
above definition clearly fits the way that they use term in their speeches and writings.” 
(p. 440 Mayer. 1996) The problem with this lack of a definition is clear. How can 
negative advertising be analyzed across the discipline if there is no general definition of 
what negative advertising is?  
 Some political scientists have offered their own definitions of negative or attack 
advertising (West, 2005, Skaperdas and Grofman, 1995, Stevens, 2005, Mayer, 1996), 
and yet there is little or no consistency in these definitions, ranging from the very general 
to more specific (see Table 3).  
 As can be seen in the definitions below, there is a wide and ultimately 
unsatisfying range of definitions for negative advertising. West’s definition for example, 
implies that negative attacks have to include deception, but there are various attacks that 
politicians can lobby at each other that do not require untruths, but may be considered  
‘negative’ by the other definitions listed. Even ‘personal attacks’ are ill defined since the 
line between personal and political can be blurred for one running for office.  Ultimately 
there does not appear to be much of an operational definition in the discipline. 
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Table 3 
Definitions of Negative Advertising 
Author Definition 
Darrell West, 2005 Substantive manipulation, whereby leaders deceive citizens 
about policy matters. (p. 169) 
Skaperdas and 
Grofman, 1995 
“Adapting terminology from Surlin and Gordon, we use the term 
negative campaigning to refer generally to that which ‘attacks the 
other candidate personally, the issues for which the other 
candidate stands, or the party of the other candidate’” (p.49) 
Stevens, 2005 “…Talking about the opponent-his or her programs, 
accomplishments, qualification, associates, and so on-with the 
focus, usually, on the defects of these attributes.” 
Mayer, 1996 “Most people who use the term seem to have in mind a definition 
such as the following: Negative campaigning is campaigning that 
attacks or is critical of an opposing candidate.” (p.440) 
Haynes and Rhine, 1998 “We define ‘attack’ politics as a candidate’s strategic use of 
intermediated anti-rival statements. The purpose of using such 
negative messages is to weaken support for and thus eliminate 
the targeted rival.” (p.695)  
Lau and Pomper 2002 “Negative campaigning is talking about the opponent – his or her 
programs, accomplishments, qualifications, associates and so on, 
with the focus, usually on the defects of these attributes” (p. 48) 
 
There is a precedent for this research in political science. James Thurber has 
conducted a survey of political consultants semi-annually since 1999 for the Center for 
Congressional and Presidential Studies. In his research the goal is to understand the 
standards and practices amongst campaign managers in order to create a functional and 
enforceable code of ethics. While that research agenda does not specifically seek a 
definition of negative advertising from consultants, it does lay the groundwork for one of 
the only other surveys conducted of political consultants.  This work provides examples 
of what may constitute negative campaigning in practice but no general definition of 
negative advertising emerged from his respondents. When asked, “What ethical problems 
do you see in negative advertising,” respondents gave examples such as: 
• One candidate’s staff member put up a fake web site for the opposition with 
false negative information. 
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• Blind mailings that are negative, with no disclaimers. You don’t know where 
the source is [since] there is no return address.  (Thurber 1999) 
 While negative advertising may all be in the eye of the beholder (Lau and Pomper 
p.48, 2002), political consultants may draw a distinction between types of attack ads in a 
way that academics may or may not recognize (Nelson, Dulio and Medvic p. 49 2002; 
Alvarez and Hall, p. 86, 2004).  
Factors Predicting the Use of Negative Advertising 
 Political advertising can be as varied as the campaigns where they are employed.  
Some ads focus on positive traits of the candidate, others highlight key issues, and some 
are a variation of several types. However, ads that are focused against another candidate 
will generally target one of two areas, either that candidate’s policy positions or their 
personal characteristics. It is in fact the supposed dearth of policy attacks and focus on 
personality in negative ads that has sparked the majority of the consternation both in 
political science and political commentary (Geer 2007). 
 Verbal or commercial attacks may be common in political campaigns but the 
reasons and circumstances under which these attacks occur is anything but common and 
consistent. There are several existing models of what political environments are more 
likely to elicit highly negative campaigns than others.  
 Table 4 presents a wide cross-section of political science works dealing 
specifically with negative advertising strategy, and when and how attacks ads are actually 
employed in a political campaign. The table lists some of the most consistent predictors 
gleaned from political science research about when how and under what circumstances 
negative advertising is employed during a political campaign. The first column is the 
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author of the particular model of negative advertising, the second column represents the 
dependent variable, the third column represents some of the main predictors for the use of 
negative advertising from each study and the third column presents the effect of negative 
advertising strategy found from the predictor in column three.   
 Position in Polls. Likely the most consistent predictor of the use of negative 
advertising is where the candidate falls in the polls. Generally the studies suggest that 
candidates who are behind in the polls are more likely to attack than candidates who are 
ahead, assuming they have the funds to do so (Skaperdas & Grofman 1995; Sigelman 
&Shiraev 2002; West 2005; Peterson & Djupe 2005). However the distance that a 
candidate is in the polls, and the type of candidate they are, all have an impact on how 
much polling influences their likelihood of attacking. Candidates who are trailing by 
single digits are much more likely to attack than those far behind in the polls (Haynes & 
Rhine 1998; Damore 2002). Further, challengers are more likely to attack than 
incumbents, especially when polls are taken into consideration (Hale et. al 1996; Lau and 
Pomper 2002; West 2005; Peterson & Djupe 2005). In general all the studies suggested 
that polls play a significant role in when and how attack ads are launched and that while 
other factors such as party and timing also have an effect, polls play a compelling role in 
attack strategy.  
 Party. The role of party, both in the district’s political leanings and in the partisan 
identification of candidates has an impact on negative advertising strategy as well. Most 
researchers found that Republicans were much more likely to engage in negative attacks 
than Democratic candidates (Thielen & Wilhite 1998; Lemert et al. 1999; Benoit 2004). 
This seemed to hold true even when Republicans had less money to spend than their 
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Table 4 
Predictors and Use of Negative Advertising 
 
Author 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Predictor 
 
Effect 
Darrell West, 
2005 
Candidate won or lost  Polls, (Challenger, 
Incumbent, Open Seat) 
Challenger more likely to attack, attack if behind in polls  
Peterson & 
Djupe, 2005  
Amount of negativity 
in campaign ads  
Polls, (Challenger, 
Incumbent, Open Seat), 
Funds raised, Primary or 
General Election, 
Timing  
More likely to be negative early if challenger behind in polls, Incumbent in 
the primary increases negativity in opposing party primary and general 
election, More negative at beginning and end of campaign  
Skaperdas & 
Grofman, 1995 
Likelihood of using 
negative ads  
Position in the polls  Candidates more likely to attack when behind in the polls 
Stevens, 2005 Level of information 
learned from negative 
ads  
Amount of exposure to 
negative advertising; 
level of political 
sophistication; 
Education; Race; Sex  
Negative advertising works better for political sophisticates, More 
sophisticated, more learned from negative ads, Exposure to negative ads 
lowers political knowledge of women and minorities    
Benoit, 2004 Likelihood of using 
character attacks in 
campaign  
Party Republicans more likely to attack character than Democrats  
Johnson,-Cartee 
& Copeland, 
1997 
Whether attack ads 
appear in the 
campaign and how 
many  
Population, Money,  
Level of interest, 
Candidate Status  
District’s unique make-up influences use of negative ads, Negative ads are 
more likely in low interest/education races, Challengers and Open Seats use 
more negative ads   
Damore 2002  Use of Positive or 
Negative ads  
Candidate Position in 
Polls, Days till election, 
Incumbent, Challenger, 
Partisanship, Issue 
Ownership, Attacked 
first  
Candidates behind in the polls will attack more; Candidates who are attacked, 
attack back  
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  Table 4, Continued 
Predictors and Use of Negative Advertising 
 
Author 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Predictor 
 
Effect 
Haynes & Rhine 
1998 
Probability of 
candidate launching 
negative attack; 
attack reported by 
news 
Position in polls, 
Candidate has been 
attacked 
If you are behind in the polls but by a small amount, more likely to attack, 
Candidates are more likely to attack when there are fewer people in the race, 
More likely to attack when attacked first and more likely to attack early in 
the campaign  
Sigelman & 
Shiraev 2002 
Amount and strategy 
of negativity in 
Russian presidential 
election  
Polls, Time in the 
campaign, Incumbent vs 
Challenger, Voter 
awareness/education  
Incumbents less likely to attack, Challengers more likely to attack, Attacks 
come before important milestones in campaign, Sophisticated voters lead to 
more attacks   
Hale, Fox and 
Farmer 1996 
Presence of negative 
ads in a campaign  
Candidate Status, 
Competitiveness of race, 
District population  
Each of these should have a significant effect on when negative ads are used, 
challengers attack more than incumbents, close races are more negative than 
non-competitive races  
Thielen & 
Wilhite, 1998 
Decision to launch 
negative ads  
Challenger, Incumbent, 
Partisanship, Money, 
Position in Polls  
GOP more likely to attack than Democrats, More likely to attack with less 
funds, More funds candidate more likely to attack, wide difference in polls 
no diff between GOP and Dems, closer the campaign gets more likely that 
GOP will attack, Challenger more likely to attack  
Lau and Pomper 
2002 
Success in election 
polls  
Challenger; Incumbent; 
Money; Party; Position 
Sought 
Challengers improve in polls when they attack incumbents; Incumbents do 
better to use positive ads than attack ads, attack ads may actually lower their 
votes; Candidates with huge money advantage or disadvantage more likely 
to attack; District partisan preference has impact on tone of negativity and 
candidate success; Senators seeking re-election have differing chances if 
facing challenger governors, or major office holders.  
Lau and Pomper 
2004 
Likelihood of 
attacking  
Polls; Challengers; 
Money; Republicans  
Candidates behind in the polls more likely to attack, candidates in close 
races are more likely to attack; Challengers more likely to attack than 
incumbents; 
Candidates with fewer funds will attack more; Republican Candidates more 
likely to attack than Democrats 
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Democratic opponents. Previous research on negative advertising effects has suggested 
that partisanship plays a role in how negative advertising is processed (Ansolabehere and 
Iyenger 1995) and by extension the make up of the election district, whether the voters 
lean Republican, Democratic or Independent also plays a role in when and how negative 
advertising is employed (Johnson – Cartee & Copeland 1997). Partisanship appears to 
have two roles in negative advertising strategy: on the one hand current research suggests 
that there is an inherent partisan motivation that leads Republicans to be more aggressive 
than Democrats; on the other hand, the voter’s beliefs and behaviors also influence the 
degree to which negative ads are used and perceived.  
 Type of Race (Open Seat, Incumbent or Challenger).  The literature on 
negative advertising factors seems to suggest that the status of the candidate as a 
challenger, incumbent or open seat competitor has an impact on the use and amount of 
negative advertising in a campaign (Haynes and Rhine 1998; Damore 2002; Johnson-
Cartee & Copeland; Peterson and Djupe 2005), although the effects vary. Generally 
challengers are expected to attack more, (Hale et. al 1996; Hughes 2003; Lau and Pomper 
2004) since they have little to lose and often are facing daunting odds. The general 
consensus in the literature suggests that incumbents are also less likely to attack, or even 
respond if attacked (Damore 2002; Sigelman and Shiraev 2002).  In fact attacking as an 
incumbent may actually harm one’s success at the polls (Lau and Pomper 2002). As far 
as open seat races, there are mixed assessments as to their overall impact on the 
likelihood of using negative ads. Some suggest that open seat elections are neither more 
nor less negative than other campaigns and that other factors such as the political 
environment or money play a greater role (West 2005). Other works both academic and 
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otherwise suggest that that open seats are more likely to elicit negative advertising (Lau 
and Pomper 2002, Lau and Pomper 2004; Walker and Seacrest 2002;  Belier 2002). 
Overall it would appear that challengers are much more likely to attack than incumbents, 
incumbents attack under rare circumstances, or only in response to attacks from others in 
the race and open seat races’ levels of negativity may be very much contextually based.   
Position Sought. Many of the works on negative advertising focused on levels of 
negativity in various types of elections. Some research has focused on the Senate and 
legislative positions (Pfau and Burgoon 1989; Lemert et. al 1999; Pinkleton et. al 2002) 
and others focus mostly on the presidency or executive positions (Haynes and Rhine 
1998; Sigelman and Shiraev 2002; West 2005).  What is apparent in both of these 
literatures is that the type of attacks that may occur and the likelihood of attacks may 
actually differ depending on the campaign. Many legislative positions are over small 
distinct areas such as congressional districts and thus negative advertising may be more 
effective or more targeted than on the national stage like a presidency or even a state-
wide campaign such as the governor. Consequently the type of position being sought in a 
campaign may actually influence the use of negative ads as well.  
In conclusion the literature seems to suggest that there are several key areas that 
may influence how likely a candidate is to actually use negative advertising during a 
political campaign. However, while knowing what leads to candidates attacking is 
important, the content of such ads is almost as critical as the ads themselves, which leads 
to the next discussion.  
 Policy vs Character. While political science research into negative advertising 
has provided a number of potential predictors that influence when negative advertising is 
 31
employed, there is another aspect of negative advertising research that is almost equally 
important; content. While ‘campaign advertising’ is often divided in political science into 
either contrast, attack, or positive ads (Hughes 2003; Geer 2006) with varying definitions, 
this research focuses on the two main content themes of attack ads, policy and character. 
Benoit (2000) discusses in detail how there are multiple forms of attacks but they mostly 
revolve around either issues of the candidates’ character and or their policy positions. 
This distinction is critical since not only can voters potentially react differently to these 
two strands of attack but can often make policy inferences from character ads either 
positively or negatively (Hacker et. al 2000.) It still subject to debate which strand of 
attack is used more often by candidates (Pfau and Burgoon 1989; Thurber, Nelson and 
Dulio – Chapter 3 - 2000), however Jamieson found that…”This analysis demonstrates 
that the majority of verbal content in political advertisements is not discussion of policy.” 
(p. 60 – Thurber, Nelson and Dulio 2000). Homer and Batra (1994) found that there were 
substantive differences in attack content on the campaign environment. Attacks on a 
candidate’s character proved to have a greater influence on voter evaluations of a 
candidate than attacks on competence (policy/accomplishments).  
In terms of who is using which type of content more, journalistic and academic 
sources suggest that Republican party candidates are much more likely to use character 
attacks than are Democrats, regardless of the race. “Republicans are planning to spend 
the vast majority of their sizable financial war chest over the final 60 days of the 
campaign attacking Democratic House and Senate candidates over personal issues and 
local controversies, GOP officials said.” (VandeHei and Cillizza, Washington Post, Sept 
10th, 2006; see also Rosenthal, Washington Post, October 29th 1992; Berke, New York 
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Times, August 14th 1996; Crowley, the Observer, April 20th 2008;  ). In fact, research 
conducted at the University of Missouri on presidential television campaign spots showed 
that “…from 1952-2000, 44% of Republican attacks concerned character and 56% were 
about policy. For Democrats, on the other hand, only 33% of their attacks were on 
character and 67% addressed policy.” (Benoit 2004). Consequently while studying the 
predictors of campaign attacks is important the content of the ads is important as well, 
and the likelihood of divergent strategies based on political affiliation.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 Major predictors of negative advertising from the preceding review of the 
research literature are used to develop research questions and hypotheses of relationships 
with political consultants’ ratings of the predictors.  Predictors will be analyzed in 
multivariate models to hold constant the effects of the remaining predictors. 
Research Question #1:  How do political consultants define negative 
advertising? 
Hypothesis #1: The definition of negative advertising advanced by political 
consultants will vary from definitions in the literature.  
Research Question #2: What impact does a candidate’s position in the polls have 
on the extent to which consultants report they used negative ads? 
Hypothesis #2: Those consultants whose candidates behind in the polls will be 
more likely to report they used negative ads than those candidates who are ahead 
in the polls 
Research Question #3: What impact does the position that a candidate is seeking 
have on the extent to which consultants report they used negative advertising? 
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Hypothesis #3: Consultants whose candidates seeking executive positions will be 
more likely to report the use of negative advertising than those seeking legislative 
positions. 
Research Question #4: What impact does partisanship have on the likelihood of 
a consultant employing negative advertising? 
Hypothesis #4: Democrats will be less likely to employ negative advertising than 
Republicans  
Research Question #5: What impact does the type of election (Challenger;  
Incumbent, or Open Seat) have on likelihood of consultants using negative advertising? 
Hypothesis #5: Consultants for challengers are more likely to employ negative 
advertising than consultants for incumbents and open seat races.  
Research Question #6: Do Democratic or Republican political consultants differ 
in their strategies to attack character or policy?  
Hypothesis #6: Republican consultants are more likely to admit to attacking 
character than consultants who work for Democrats, and the there will be no 
difference in willingness to attack on policy.  
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Candidate Positioning  
Campaigns are dynamic environments and in some cases candidate positions are 
changed, altered or shifted during the course of the election. This analysis proposes to 
look at two of the main theories in political science on candidate positioning and 
determine how reflective these theories are of actual positioning strategies of political 
consultants. Further, we will examine how and under what circumstances consultants 
believe in altering positions during a political campaign. 
 In Down’s seminal work ‘An Economic Theory of Democracy’ (1957) he 
suggests some basic rules about when, how and why a citizen chooses to vote in an 
election and by extension how candidates place themselves to win elections. Citizens 
evaluate the utility they will receive from re-electing the sitting party (incumbent) versus 
their expected utility in electing the other party (challenger). On a given issue, assuming a 
uni-dimensional scale from right to left ideologically, the ideal position of most voters 
will be the political center. The candidate positioned closest to the centrist or median 
issue position without alienating their base is most likely to win those voters.  
This theory makes several key assumptions about both the voters and the 
candidates running for office. First, that the voters have ‘perfect information’ and thus 
know exactly where the candidates stand on every given issue; second, that the voters 
will eventually vote sincerely for the issue that they believe in; and finally, that the 
positions taken by the candidates are stable and will not change during the campaign 
period. While a number of these assumptions are uncommon in the real world of 
campaigning, the prevailing notion of the theory, that voters huddle in the middle of 
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policy space, and that the candidate who positions closest to them wins, is the key part of 
the theory for this research.   
Directional theory is the most significant alternative to the Downs’ Proximity or 
Spatial model of candidate and positioning behavior. The directional model incorporates 
two key elements in the campaign position and theory argument: direction and intensity. 
Rabinowitz, and MacDonald (1989) argue that successful positioning in a campaign is 
taking a policy stand on the right ‘side’ of key issues. “If we think in symbolic politics 
terms, the directional prediction makes sense. The voter who prefers one side of a debate 
to the other but cares little about the issue would not generally be expected to support the 
candidate who favors the opposite side and says little” (p. 97 Rabinowitz, MacDonald, 
1989). While the Downsian model argues that the distance between the voter’s position 
and the candidate’s stance is the ultimate determinant of vote choice, the directional 
model argues that direction and intensity of the stance that both the voters and candidates 
show for a given issue is the determinant of vote choice. The median voter remains 
important in the directional model but in a different manner. The goal of a candidate in 
this model is to place themselves in the position to capture the median voter by being 
intense in the direction of that voter without moving outside the region of responsibility 
where they would be perceived as being too extreme.  a place to capture those voters who 
care for the issue in the direction in which the candidate stands, without moving outside 
of the ‘region of acceptability’ wherein they will be seen as too extreme for most voters. 
“The more intense a candidate is on an issue, the more the candidate generates intense 
support or opposition with regard to that issue. By taking clear, strong, stands, 
candidates can make an issue central to judgments about themselves.” (p. 98, Rabinowitz  
 36
 These two theories have elicited considerable research as other researchers have 
examined, refuted and in some cases augmented the conclusions reached in the 
Directional (Spatial or Proximity) models of candidate positioning. For example, Anders 
Westholm has consistently argued that in fact the proximity model is the model more 
reflective of candidate positioning and that the directional model is fundamentally flawed 
Westholm 1997; 2001). Lewis and King (1998) argued that under some circumstances 
both models can be correct, and Grofman (2004) argues that there are so many 
assumptions that apply to the proximity model that it’s effectiveness is powerful but 
limited to certain circumstances. This research does not attempt to wade into the debate 
over the superiority of one model over another, merely to assess which model might be 
more reflective amongst this data set of positioning behavior. Table 5 presents a brief 
summary of some of the main theories re-examining directional and proximity theory. 
The key to this table is the focus on the model and the ‘predictors’ analyzed from each 
study. The ‘model’ listed for each work is the model that is the focus of the research.  
Also listed is the data used to create the analysis. In some cases there is no ‘data’ because 
the research focuses on formal models, and in these cases the term formal model is used. 
The ‘predictor’ column explains what factors the researchers conclude have an effect on 
the directional or proximity models.   
 Party. In many models the strength of partisanship of the individual voter, the 
candidate or the aggregate partisan leanings of the entire voting district are key to how 
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Table 5 
Predictors of Candidate Positioning 
Author Model Predictor Result 
Gershtenson 2004 Proximity Model  Senate Races; Polls 
Open Seat Races; Party  
Other factors must be taken into consideration as to whether or not the proximity 
model really reflects the candidate’s strategy 
Gershtenson 2003 Proximity Model – 
Congressional Elections 
only   
District Partisanship; 
Party; Polls; Election 
Year; Voter perception of 
economy; Incumbency  
The proximity model is not the key determinant of electoral success, other factors 
have greater influence, close elections increase likelihood of proximity model  
Ansolabehere, 
Snyder and Stewart, 
2001 
Spatial Model/ Downsian 
Model  
National Political 
Awareness Test analyzed  
District Partisanship; Time 
of election; Type of Races  
Position Sought; Polls  
The median voter model varies depending on district and level of race candidate 
is seeking; the closer the election the more likely incumbents do not seek median 
voter, “Open seats contestants are on average more extreme than incumbents, 
although they are less extreme than other challengers.” (p.153) Downs is 
weakened convergence does not happen district or national  
Francis and Kenny 
(1996) 
Americans for 
Democratic action scores 
analyzed to establish 
‘winning policy position’ 
Party; Position Sought  Different winning positions on the median depending on party  
Bernstein 1995 Critiques Proximity 
model using ANES data  
Party; Party Affect; Issues  
Election Year 
 
“..the optimal political strategy in multi-issue campaigns is not to appeal to the 
center on issues offering concentrated benefits, but instead to adopt positions 
closer to those favored by proponents of the benefits” (p. 499)  
Glazer and Grofman 
1989 
Formal Models no data  Feasibility point  Voters may not chose the candidate who places themselves closest to their policy 
preferences, unless they believe such policies are feasible and that the candidate 
can achieve them  
Conover and 
Feldman 1982 
Analysis of 1976 CPS 
National Election Survey 
and 3 models of vote 
choice  
Issue Voting 
Inference Voting 
Projection Voting  
Voters are not likely following the strict proximity model since issue positions 
are often vague, more likely to infer the position than project  
Franklin 1991 NES Data from 1988 
Senate Election Study 
 
Party; Challenger attacks 
positions; Incumbent focus 
on issues; election year  
Assumes Proximity model of right to left, candidates chose positions but attacks 
from opponent and party identification affect how clear positions are median 
voter not always best option to win campaign  
Bergen  Proximity model  Incumbent; Challenger; 
Campaign donations  
Incumbents more likely to take moderate positions, Challengers more likely to 
take extreme positions, incumbents moderate to raise funds  
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Table 5, Continued 
Predictors of Candidate Positioning 
Author Model Predictor Result 
McGann, Koetzle 
and Grofman 2002 
Proximity Model- 
position information from 
Americans for 
Democratic Action and 
American Conservative 
Union. 
Number of candidates 
running, sequential 
elections, run-off 
elections, plurality 
elections  
Winning position is between the median and the mode, not the median voter, 
especially when voter preferences are skewed, run-off and sequential elections 
more likely to pick median position candidate  
Wuffle, Feld, Owen 
and Grofman 1989 
Spatial Model  Incumbency  
Issue Positions  
There is a ‘finagle’ point such that there is a perfectly defensible space in a two 
person election battle, but this position can vary depending on the race  
Francis and Kenney 
1996 
Spatial Model  Position Being Sought  As candidates seek higher office they veer away from the middle, to more 
extreme positions, both parties do this and winners have a greater likelihood of 
engaging in this behavior 
Adams, Bishin and 
Dow 2004 
Discounting Theory of 
Voters  
Directional Model  
Pooled Senate Election 
Study 1988-1992 
Party; Race; Education; 
Income; Incumbency; 
Challengers; Money spent  
Policy discounting and directional effects are more common than proximity 
effects in candidate positioning, single elections cannot be used only must be 
looked at across elections, individual and aggregate voting more resemble the 
directional model in senate races  
Platt, Poole and 
Rosenthal 1992 
Directional-Spatial Model 
Comparison  
NES Data; Partisanship 
Voter Awareness  
The Spatial model is more reflective of informed voters, the directional model 
is more reflective of uninformed voters  
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and where candidates chose to position themselves in the policy space. (Glazer and 
(2002), Gershtenson (2003) and Bernstein (1995). In fact, many of the studies analyzed 
Grofman 1989; Franklin 1991; Bernstein 1995; Francis and Kenney 1996; Ansolabehere 
et. al 2001; McGann et. al 2002; Gershtenson 2003; Adams et. al 2004). In some studies 
the effect of party comes in the form of the general disposition of the community. For 
example, Ansolabehere et. al (2001) finds that regardless of the leanings of particular 
local communities, there has been increased divergence from the spatial mean in 
candidates for the United States Senate. Similar results were found by McGann et. al 
seem to come to a similar conclusion, which is that the spatial model is less reflective of 
the real world of candidate issue positioning in large part due to the lack of proper 
consideration for partisan intensity and voting behavior. Whether directional or proximity 
models are discussed however, it would appear that partisanship on the individual or 
aggregate level plays a key role in candidate positioning.  
Minorities. An extension of the partisanship concept is the idea of ‘passionate’ 
minorities in a district. These can be minority groups based on issues or ethnicity. In the 
case of ethnic minorities, studies have suggested that large concentrations of minority 
voters can have a significant impact on the positions taken by candidates running for 
office, or at least the generalized voting behavior of the district (Wright 1977; Morris 
2000, Shotts 2001). Minorities often present a unique and concentrated group of voters, 
especially if they are motivated to turn out and thus could conceivably have an impact on 
either model of candidate positioning. Moreover, political consultants are uniquely 
attuned to the demographics of their campaign districts and thus might be affected by 
large or active minority populations.  
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 Type of Race (Challenger, Incumbent, Open Seat).  Whether one is an 
incumbent, challenger or in an open seat election plays a significant role in candidate 
positioning as well. Incumbents, especially those facing weak challengers, are more 
inclined to take moderate stances, and in some cases, work their base over the median 
voter in elections. (Franklin 1991; Ansolabehere et. al 2001;Gershtenson 2003; Aragones 
and Palfrey 2004). Further, incumbents can often benefit from being able to control the 
issue agenda in the campaign and thus determine where and how the opposition positions 
themselves on key issues. Challengers, on the other hand may or may not have a 
moderating influence on the issue positions taken in campaign, but this is usually a 
reflection of how competitive the election is. The more competitive the election, the more 
candidates will not chose the center and will attempt to distinguish themselves in the 
electoral policy space (Bernstein 1995; Francis and Kenney 1996; Ansolabehere et. al 
2001). Finally, open seat races seem to have a middle effect on candidate positioning 
during a campaign. While open seat candidates are more extreme in their position taking 
than incumbents, they are often less extreme than challengers, assuming that the race is 
reasonably competitive.   
Position Sought.  One of the most important elements of candidate positioning is 
the position the candidate is seeking. The vast majority of works on candidate positions 
focus on candidates running for, or serving in, legislative office (Platt et al 1992; Francis 
and Kenney 1996; Ansolabehere et. al 2001; Adams et al, 2004), while relatively few 
focus on executive office seekers that aren’t the presidency (Bernstein 1995). In some 
cases, this difference in position being sought leads to conclusions about the value of the 
proximity model over the directional model (Platt et. al 1992) but the majority of the 
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works suggest the success of legislative candidates making issue appeals to intense 
minorities, or seeking not the median voter but some other key position in the policy 
space (Wuffle et. al 1989; Lublin 2003).  
 In conclusion, there are several key factors that seem to influence how likely the 
proximity or directional model is to reflect candidate positioning. The type of candidate 
running, their party, the closeness of the election, the district demographics and even the 
position being sought all seem to have an impact on which model might be more 
reflective. Political consultants, charged with organizing and marketing position strategy 
for campaigns may be influenced by these predictors as well. Moreover, these factors 
likely influence candidate positioning during a campaign regardless of what overall 
election model is being suggested.  
 Issue Ownership. Issue ownership is a concept focused on initially by Petrocik 
(1996) and Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994); Norpoth and Buchannan (1992). The core 
of the concept is that throughout the lives of voters, parties become inextricably linked to 
certain policies and further to certain policy stances. This impacts how political 
campaigns should be run according to Ansolabehere et. al (1994), where candidates 
should focus their political advertising on those issues where they are perceived to have a 
comparative advantage against the opposition. The core concept of ‘issue ownership’ 
literature is that since these parties are so strongly linked to certain concepts, attempts to 
veer from these set policy spaces can have serious consequences during the campaign.  
Norpoth and Buchannan (1992) argue that ‘issue trespassing,’ where a candidate 
attempts to take a position that is similar to their opposition or stake out territory in a 
policy area they are not associated with, is almost impossible. In most cases voters are 
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too set in their views about policy positions for parties to believe that the issue change 
has actually occurred.  Holian (2004) argues that such ‘trespassing’ is possible but only 
with candidates of great rhetorical skill and in many cases these attempts can harm a 
candidate’s chances if voters perceive them to be moving too far away from their base.   
Issue ownership and issue trespassing literature seem to agree on the issues that 
are owned by each political party, with foreign affairs, and national defense often owned 
by the GOP, and domestic affairs, education, and more recently the economy often 
owned by the Democrats (Aldrich et. al 1989; Ansolabehere 1994; Petrocik 1996 and 
Egan 2006). Nevertheless each of these studies has been based on data from national 
election surveys focusing on voter perspectives. It is not clear if political operators 
themselves have the same degree of belief in just what issues are owned by which parties. 
It is entirely possible that Republican voters and Republican consultants may perceive 
positions on key issues differently, if the consultants believe that position changes can be 
made palatable.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 Major predictors of candidate positioning from the preceding review of the 
research literature are used to develop research questions and hypotheses of relationships 
between consultants and position behavior. Each predictor will be analyzed in 
multivariate models to hold constant the effects of the remaining predictors. 
Research Question #1: Which theory of candidate positioning, the directional or 
proximity theory most approximates how consultants organize candidate positioning 
during a campaign?  
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Hypothesis #1: The Directional model is more reflective of consultant’s attitudes 
of candidate positioning than the proximity model  
Research Question #2: What factors influence whether a consultant moves 
towards a directional or more proximity like model during a campaign? 
Hypothesis #2: There most significant factor will be the partisan identification of 
the candidate.  
Research Question #3: What issues do campaign consultants feel the most 
comfortable changing positions on, what positions do they feel the least comfortable 
changing positions on? 
Hypothesis #3: There will be a difference in the issues on which consultants for 
Republican and Democratic candidates will feel comfortable changing positions. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has established some of the key areas in political science regarding 
campaigns, and moreover how political consultants view their role and influence may 
provide some key insight into these existing theories. Having established the current 
research questions and hypotheses based on the existing literature, we now move to the 
research design, methods and then analysis sections. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
  
Research Design: Methods, Data and Data Collection  
  
  
 This chapter describes the methods used to develop the survey of political 
consultants that will comprise the primary data for this dissertation and will help test the 
hypotheses established in chapter 2. The chapter presents: a brief overview of previous 
studies of political consultants whose methods informed the research methods of this 
dissertation; a discussion of how the main themes of this survey were confirmed and how 
the questions for the survey were developed; a description of the creation and 
implementation of the pilot survey; and a description of the implementation of the final 
survey.  
 There are a relatively limited number of studies that provide analyses of political 
consultants and from which this dissertation could use as a guiding model.  The majority 
of studies on political consultants relied almost exclusively on interviews with campaign 
professionals or case studies that relied on observation (Thielen and Wilhite 1998; Bailey 
et al 2001; Jamieson and Waldman 2001).  While there is a value in case studies and 
constructed interviews for political theory building (Johnson Cartee Copeland 1997), the 
research questions for this analysis require a level of data that is subject to statistical and 
empirical analysis.  
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 Three of the most prominent surveys of political consultants analyzed in political 
science were conducted by Campaigns and Elections magazine (1993); Herrnson 1986, 
and Thurber (a series of surveys beginning in 1999).  
Campaigns and Elections magazine, the premier trade magazine for political 
consultants has conducted at least one extensive survey of consultants primarily focused 
on the winning and losing records of consultants (Mundy, Campaigns and Elections, 
January 1993). Medvic and Lenart (1997) used this data to analyze the degree to which 
having a professional political consultant on staff actually increased non-incumbents’ 
chances of winning house elections.  The original data was collected by the Campaigns 
and Elections staff, they contacted all of the consultants who advertised within their 
magazine and asked for a list of their clients.  There were problems with this approach: 
“We thought it would be simple -- just call up consulting firms, ask them for their 
client lists. But when we started looking at the lists they supplied, we noticed something 
strange. Virtually every consultant claimed a winning percentage of more than 90 and 
almost no losers…. A scrutiny of more than 1000 FEC candidate disbursement records 
revealed that fewer than a dozen of 184 firms had provided us with a complete and 
accurate list. The rest had failed to submit complete information or had, shall we say, 
embellished.” (Mundy, Campaigns and Elections, January 1993). 
Eventually a list of clients for campaign firms was complied using data from the 
Federal Elections Commission and a list of which campaigns had more winners and 
losers was established.  Medvic and Lemert (1997) looked at which campaigns for non-
incumbents hired political consulting firms and whether they won or lost and how much 
did they win or lose by.  They compiled the remainder of their information from final 
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election results and what demographic information they could compile for certain areas. 
While this method of finding consultants through looking at official lists in Campaigns 
and Elections magazine was helpful, it was clear that this data was used almost 
exclusively to determine winners from losers rather than strategy.  
 Herrnson’s research in 1986 focused on the role of political action committees 
and their increasing role in changing the level and power of political parties in the United 
States campaign process.  His research began with an interview with Democratic and 
Republican political leaders and party chairs in 1984 in order to establish what types of 
questions he should ask regarding the role of parties and outside organizations to 
congressional campaigners and activists.  He then sent out a mail questionnaire to the 
staffs of all Republican and Democratic candidates for the House in 1984 asking them to 
rate how influential political action committees and outside interest groups were to 
fundraising, campaign management and voter turnout activities for the election campaign. 
A total of 734 questionnaires were mailed, resulting in 385 usable surveys for his 
analysis, a response rate of about 52%,  The results were categorized according to party, 
candidate status (incumbent, challenger and open seat) and competitiveness of the race. 
Herrnson’s results provide an indicator of the help and services provided by different 
groups during a campaign; however they do not necessarily provide much information 
into campaign strategy or attitudes towards campaign strategy.  
 James Thurber’s work on political consultants began in 1999 with a survey of 
political consultants as well as structured interviews.  Thurber’s work was part of a larger 
research agenda initiated by the American Association of Political Consultants and the 
Pew Charitable trusts.  The stated goals of their survey were to: 
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• Examine the roles of political consultants and political parties in the 
electoral process, 
• Understand consultant’s perception of political campaigns and 
candidates, and 
• Observe the frequency of unethical campaign practices in the political 
consulting industry including: (1) examples of ethical problems in recent 
campaigns and (2) the necessity for a code of ethics. 
The first survey was conducted in 1999 from April 5th and May 14th of 1999 
through structured interviews with a list of political consultants compiled by American 
University with the assistance of the American Association of Political Consultants. A 
total of 505 interviews were conducted and interview answers were then used primarily 
in survey form without statistical analysis.  The survey was re-administered in 2002 from 
November 6th to December 12th via telephone and with on-line interviews with 204 
consultants who had participated in the previous study.  These results were used to find 
out information on campaign ethics and professionalism.  Again, as with Herrnson’s 
work, Thurber’s questions seldom dealt with strategy, aside from some questions 
regarding negative advertising, but mostly dealt with what consultants believed was right 
and wrong in the campaigning process. 
Survey Development 
 Three themes were prominent in the literature regarding political campaigns and 
likely consultant attitudes: (1) Candidate Traits, the unique or valuable abilities of a 
candidate that may help them during a campaign; (2) Negative Advertising, or attack 
advertising; and (3) Campaign Positions, the extent to which a candidate takes a centrist 
 48
or middle-of-the-road policy.  Taking a cue from Herrnson’s confirmatory interviews 
with party leaders, to confirm that the themes identified in political science literature 
comport with the themes common to political consultants, analyses of case studies in 
Campaigns and Elections magazine were conducted to ensure that the themes were 
actually reflective of the concerns and used terminology that would be familiar to the 
survey respondents.  If the survey was developed and implemented using only themes 
from political science without having been compared to themes familiar with consultants, 
the survey might be confusing, poorly received and ineffective.   
  Campaigns and Elections articles continue to be used by the vast majority of both 
journalists and academics seeking to study or inform themselves about political 
consultants.  While the American Association of Political Consultants does send out 
pamphlets and information, the depth, consistency and reliability of information on 
consultants that is collected from Campaigns and Elections cannot be matched.  The 
magazine has been in publication for 25 years, moving from quarterly to bi-monthly in 
1986 and then to monthly publication in 1990.  
The primary procedure to confirm the themes was a content analysis of 
Campaigns and Elections magazine articles from July to November of the election years 
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 to determine the frequency of the listed themes in the 
literature.[1]   The specific years of Campaigns and Elections magazine were chosen 
because they are all election years, both on and “off,” and provide a diverse array of 
presidential and congressional victories.  All articles with headings of ‘Electioneering,’ 
‘Politics…practical,’ or ‘Advertising, Political’ from the EBSCOhost electronic journal’s 
database at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill were examined in the content 
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analysis.  These subject headings were selected because the articles they contained 
focused most consistently on consultants’ views on campaigns and strategy.  A total of 22 
case studies were produced by this method and these were examined to determine and 
identify consultant beliefs.  Excluded from this analysis were case studies that focused on 
non-candidate centered races and referendums (n=4).  Of the remaining 18 case studies, 
six focused on challenger vs. incumbent races, 10 focused on open seat races, and two 
focused on campaigns where two incumbents faced each other because of re-districting. 
There were two main content analysis programs that could have been employed 
for this analysis: Atlas ti (atlasti.com), and NUD*IST (Kerlin 2002). While both programs 
are powerful and used in many social science works (Barry 1998) Atlas ti gives the 
researcher more freedom in creating the categories for searching documents and media 
and the units of analysis are much smaller than NUD*IST in most cases, thus capturing 
more information.  Atlas it can analyze almost any type of material that can be 
downloaded into a computer.  The researcher then creates ‘hermetic units’ for the 
program to follow.  The hermetic unit is essentially the key words, or concepts the 
researcher is searching for to define a theme or term in the content being analyzed.  For 
example, to locate the consistency of the theme, “Candidate traits” in the data, the 
following hermetic unit was created: ability, skills, speaker, connect, empathy, 
communication, constituent, leadership, honesty.  Therefore, sections of text that have 
these words or similar words in them will be collected under the theme of ‘candidate 
traits’ for this analysis. 1 
                                                 
1
 The words used for the hermetic units were derived from the initial analysis of the case studies. 
The hermetic units were the following: (Candidate Traits:  ability, skills, speaker, connect, 
empathy, communication, constituent, leadership, honesty); (Negative Advertising: attack, attack 
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 All of the Campaigns and Elections articles from a particular year were placed 
into the Atlas ti program to be reviewed.  The results of the program were collected into 
paragraphs based on how linked the program finds the phrases to be.  Consequently this 
may result in a one sentence packet of information or several sentences.  Table 6 provides 
examples of the data output for candidate traits from Atlas ti, by the year of the article 
from Campaigns and Elections.  
Table 6 
Content Analysis Results Using Atlas it  
  
Year Output 
2000 P 4: Aug2000Vol21Is7p38.txt - 4:8  (303:306)   (Super) 
Codes:  [Candidate traits] [Racial Issues] 
  
When a candidate must appeal to many groups – ethnic groups, age groups, socio-
economic groups and the like-he or she is more likely to turn to a focus group to learn 
how to communicate better. 
2002 P21: Jul2002Vol23Is6p65.txt - 21:1  (132:133)   (Super) 
Codes:  [Candidate traits] 
  
The two most important are perceived electability and a candidate's ability to make a 
credible, persuasive ask (sic). 
1998 P 8: Aug98Vol19Is8p46.txt - 8:36  (192:194)   (Super) 
Codes:  [Candidate traits] 
  
She says, "Anyone who doesn't connect with voters by phone should be prepared to 
lose." Julia Emmons used it in the summer of 1997 to establish name recognition. 
1996 P 4: Aug96Vol17Is8p37.txt - 4:20  (144:147)   (Super) 
Codes:  [Candidate traits] 
  
Because the Democratic candidates agreed on most issues Alioto's simple visual and 
compelling personal story were getting traction where the other candidates were 
having trouble connecting with voters. 
  
 As shown, the data provides general pieces of information that can make scanning 
through large sums of information more efficient and the coding methodology more 
                                                                                                                                                 
ads, advertising, negative, negative advertising); (Candidate Position: outside, extreme, stand 
moderate, center, centrist, mainstream, middle, median) 
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reliable.  Each section of information lifted from the document is labeled based on how it 
was imputed into the program.  For example, the first output listed has the heading: P 4: 
Aug2000Vol21Is7p38.txt.  The article was downloaded into the Atlas ti program from 
Campaigns and Elections magazine; it was the 7th issue of the magazine to be released in 
the year 2000; and the information was gleaned from page 38 of the magazine.  
 Atlas ti is not the perfect content analysis program however.  Many times results 
can be obtained that contain large paragraphs that have key phrases from the hermetic 
unit and yet have nothing to do with the overall research goal.  It is during these times 
that it’s important to look at the context of all content analysis survey results to make sure 
that the information is valid. 
 The results of the content analysis show that each theme was consistently 
mentioned in the Campaigns and Elections articles each year (Table 7).  This lends 
additional support to the importance of the three themes for the survey development. 
Note that no attempt was made to rank these themes as to frequency because the terms 
used in the content analysis varied from very general to specific. 
  
Table 7 
Frequency of Appearance for Themes  
by Campaigns and Elections Publication Year 
  
Theme 1996 1998 2000 2002 Total 
Candidate Traits 25 20 56 66 167
Negative Advertising 32 89 82 33 236
Campaign Position 56 45 109 82 292
Total 113 154 247 181 695
 
 Finding that the campaign themes discovered in the analysis did in fact overlap 
with existing dialogue of political professionals it seemed reasonable to conduct a survey 
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around these themes. Survey questions were also based on analysis provided in chapter 2. 
The final survey had 80 questions (Table 8) with 12 questions concerning candidate 
traits, 21 questions concerning negative advertising, and 15 questions concerning 
campaign positions.  Other questions included consultant demographics (8 questions), 
district demographics (15 questions) and questions about race and gender (4 questions).  
Table 8 
Number of items by Survey Area 
Survey Questions N 
Consultant Information 8
District Demographics 15
Candidate Traits 12
Negative Advertising 21
Campaign Positions 15
Message, Definition 5
Racial Issues 4
Total 80
  
Pilot Study 
 A pilot study is an initial test of an idea or concept on a small sample before 
administering it to a larger population.  This survey was pilot tested in two phases: (1) 
students in political science classes completed the paper survey during class time, and (2) 
knowledgeable political science experts reviewed the survey after it had been developed 
 The first phase of the pilot study was conducted at the Bliss Institute at the 
University of Akron and the George Washington School of Political Management. 
Faculty at each institution gave permission for the survey to be administered in their 
classes (one class from each institution).  The pilot was conducted in the fall of 2005 and 
the spring of 2006 and resulted in 57 completed surveys out of a total of 64 students who 
started the survey.  It was clear that there was respondent fatigue, since the survey was 
long (88 questions), it had to be done by hand, and took about 35 minutes to complete. 
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However, the survey also held the students’ interest and based on students’ comments 
only 7 questions were eliminated from the survey and several questions were re-written.  
Final Survey  
 In order to create the final survey for this dissertation that would actually go into 
the field (see appendix for final survey), the responses and concerns from the pilot were 
taken into consideration.  Given how long it took for respondents to complete the pilot by 
hand, it was decided to use one of the on-line survey sites that provided user-friendly, 
visually appealing surveys that respondents could simply link to and use.  The on-line 
survey program that was eventually selected was Surveymonkey.com for several reasons.  
It provided the basic tools necessary for the analysis: the ability to filter and sort the 
information by relevant categories, download the survey results into SPSS or Stata 
statistical programs, and was the most affordable service with comparable resources (20 
dollars a month).  
 Before administering the survey to the total survey population, four political 
experts known to the author tested the survey and provided final commentary and 
suggestions. These four experts were: two faculty members from political science 
departments, one speechwriter, and one political campaign consultant. They 
recommended wording changes but did not recommend a reduction in the length of the 
survey. The survey, on average, took the expert respondents 25 minutes to complete, a 
full 10 minutes less than the paper pilot survey delivered earlier. The following are 
examples of the main suggestions by the experts. All suggestions were implemented. 
• A speechwriter for several Democratic Congressional and gubernatorial 
candidates suggested changes in the vocabulary of the Negative 
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Advertising section to make sure that respondents knew what was meant 
by attack ads. 
• A communications director for a long term Democratic incumbent from a 
major urban district suggested that the respondents be reminded 
throughout the survey how much of the survey was left to be completed. 
She also suggested changing the color scheme from black and white for 
the background to something more appealing. 
• A faculty member at the University of Akron’s Bliss Institute for Political 
Management and former vice president of the American Association of 
Women Political Consultants suggested that the questions about political 
messages should not lead anyone into giving particular answers and 
further recommended reducing the number of open-ended questions. 
•  A professor of Political Science at Emory University and former 
professional pollster advised that reminders be added at the beginning of 
the email that people did not have to complete the survey in one sitting. 
 
The primary consideration in selecting subjects was that they were operating as 
political consultants and managers in the U.S.  Taking a cue from the Thurber surveys, 
initially the register of the American Association of Political Consultants was considered 
as a potential universe for selecting survey subjects.  The organization boasts over one 
thousand active members and is the only organization that purports to represent political 
professionals.  Several calls to firms on the register found that they had little or nothing to 
do with the day-to-day management of campaigns but only became involved when media 
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buying or GOTV (Get out the Vote programs) were necessary.  In addition the member 
list was often woefully out of date with many of the listing no longer operating or having 
changed their addresses.  
 The second approach, and the one adopted, was to identify campaigns in all 50 
states that would be conducted in the fall of 2006 and telephone each campaign to 
identify their political consultants.  The names, campaign addresses, and phone numbers 
of all citizens qualified to run in a general election in the fall were identified through the 
websites for each state board of elections or the Secretary of State.  With this information 
campaigns were called by a trained survey team, the managers or consultants for the 
campaigns were identified and surveys were sent to them once they agreed to participate. 
This process was done in the summer and fall of 2006. This method had a much better 
chance of finding the consultants who were not necessarily easily found through 
conventional means or party organizations.  Many men and women who work as 
consultants have other types of employment such as lawyers, teachers and even party 
activists who cannot be found in conventional drag-net searching methods.  
Survey Implementation  
The calls to political campaigns began in May of 2006 and proceeded into the fall 
of 2006.  Using a listing of the primary dates for all states, the lead researcher (the 
dissertation author) was able to call campaigns throughout the nation and make contact 
with many political teams right after the state primaries were over in order to better 
capture as many respondents as possible.  However, it was expected that many campaigns 
would be too busy during the summer to fill out the survey and thus the main thrust of the 
survey was timed for implementation during the two week period after the 2006 general 
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elections when campaign teams would have time to answer calls but before all offices 
were closed for the holidays.  There were calls made during the summer but the goal was 
that these calls would simply bolster the majority that would be obtained after the 
election.  
A team of three undergraduate students were trained with a script as to how to call 
political campaigns across the nation and implement the survey.  These undergraduate 
students were instructed to call the campaign headquarters and ask for the head manager 
or consultant.  Upon contacting that person, or other high ranking campaign official they 
would briefly explain the survey, ask permission to send the survey link via email and 
send it to the appropriate person or persons (to see a copy of the email sent to consultants, 
see appendix).  
The response rate was 53% for surveys with some questions answered and 34% 
for surveys with all questions answered, 193 surveys were completed.   All respondents 
who agreed to have the survey sent to them were sent a reminder email two weeks after 
receiving the survey and encouraged to complete or finish the survey if they had not by 
that point (to see a copy of the reminder email, see the appendix). 
Ethical Considerations  
This research study was reviewed and approved by the university’s Institutional 
Review Board. (Copy of approval available upon request) The personal identities of the 
subjects in this study were keep secure and will be destroyed once the study is completed.  
The subjects were volunteers and were told by the survey team that their participation 
was voluntary.  The confidentiality of each respondent was protected as part of the IRB 
requirements at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  There was no 
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identifying information associated with the consultants who responded to the survey 
outside of the ISP address from the computer where the response was sent from.  Given 
that the surveys could have been completed from any location, from the campaign office 
to a public library to an I-phone it would be impossible even from that information to 
identify any individual respondent.  
Limitations of Research Design or Methods  
This survey was conducted via sending an electronic survey over the internet. 
Consequently it is important to take into consideration the following potential 
weaknesses found in any results from this survey.  First, once sent, it is not possible to 
track who actually completed the on-line survey.  Most larger or state wide political 
campaigns have many managers, GOTV, and communications workers, so it is possible 
that the initial person who received the survey did not in fact complete the survey. 
Moreover, many campaigns required a screening of the survey, meaning the head 
consultant agreed to take the survey first, and would send it out to other members of the 
staff once they were able to see that the questions were legitimate and would not put the 
campaign at a strategic disadvantage.  The survey itself is quite self selective, and given 
the questions about campaign position, length of time in the profession and strategy those 
who were not qualified to answer the survey were likely screened out, however one 
cannot totally discount the possibility of errant respondents.  
 [1]
 Phrases used for the content analysis included: (1)” Candidate traits” in the data, the following 
hermetic unit was created: ability, skills, speaker, connect, empathy, communication, constituent, 
leadership, honesty (2) Negative Advertising – “attack, attack ads, advertising, negative, negative 
advertising;” and (3) Campaign Position- “strong, strength, outside, extreme, stand, moderate, 
center, centrist, mainstream, middle, and median.” 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Results 
 
 In this chapter, the results describing the demographics of the consultants, the 
candidates and campaign environments that formed the basis for these survey results are 
presented, followed by results for the three political campaign areas: “Candidate Traits,” 
“Negative Advertising,” and “Candidate Positioning.”  The “Candidate Traits” section 
summarizes consultants’ identification of important candidate traits by party and analyzes 
the relationships of various predictions with consultants’ ratings of five candidate traits 
identified in the literature.  The “Negative Advertising” section reviews definitions for 
negative advertising and predictors of the use and content of negative advertising.  The 
“Candidate Positioning” section analyzes what existing models in political science best 
describe the positioning strategies of political candidates and the factors that predict the 
importance of issues and what position candidates take during a race. 
Demographics  
 Consultant Demographics.  Consultant characteristics include the campaign year 
that they worked, their campaign job, their experience or the number of years they have 
worked for political campaigns, and their level of education (Table 9). The majority of 
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the consultants surveyed provided responses to the survey questions about campaigns 
they worked for in recent years. Overall, the results show that consultants answered about 
races run as recently as 2006 and as far in the past as 1971. Nevertheless 79.5% were in 
the campaign years from 2004-2006 and 95.1% were in the campaign years from 2000 to 
2006, providing a good look as to how these modern consultants view the world they 
work in. Since the majority of respondents (50.2%) were campaign managers as well, 
followed by candidates/managers (11.8%) and “Get Out The Vote” (GOTV) specialists 
(14.1%), the survey results should provide a good overall view of the strategies and inner 
workings of the campaigns in this sample.  Finally, almost a majority of the consultants 
were relatively new; about half of the respondents claimed to have worked in campaigns 
for 1 to 4 years, and 77.8% worked in campaigns from 1 to 10 years. The consultants 
were mostly college educated (57.0%), and 30.4% reported a post bachelor’s education.  
Table 9 
Consultant Demographics by Party 
Consultant Demographics Republicans 
N (%) 
Democrats 
N (%) 
Campaign Year  
2006 40(39.6) 62(38.3)  
2005 3(3.0) 12 (7.4) 
2004 39(38.6) 53(32.7) 
2003 0 5 (3.1) 
2002 and earlier  19 (18.9) 30 (18.6) 
Campaign Job 
Political Director  3 (3.0) 10 (6.2) 
Manager 56(55.4) 76(46.9) 
Media 6 (5.9)  10 (6.2) 
Get Out the Vote (GOTV) 5 (5) 32 (19.8) 
Fundraiser  9 (8.9) 10 (6.2) 
Consultant  8 (7.9) 7 (4.3) 
Candidate  14 (13.9) 17 (10.5) 
Experience    
1 – 4 years  52 (51.5)  75 (46.3) 
5 – 10 years  30 (29.7)  46 (28.4)  
11 – 15 years  14 (13.9)  16 (9.9) 
16 – 20  0 12 (7.4)  
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More than 20 years  5 (5.0)  13 (8.0) 
Level of Education 
High-School or Associates Degree 19( 18.8)  14 (8.7)  
Bachelors  62 (61.4)  88 (54.3)  
Master’s Degree 13 (12.9)  44( 27.2) 
Ph.D.  1 (1.0) 4 (2.5)  
Professional Degree 6 (5.9) 12 (7.4)  
  
 There were some differences between the parties regarding the consultant’s 
backgrounds.  More consultants in Democratic campaigns (19.8%) worked as GOTV 
compared to Republican consultants (5.0%) while somewhat more Republican 
consultants (55.4%) worked as campaign managers compared to Democratic consultants 
(46.9%).  More consultants for Democratic campaigns reported post graduate degrees 
(32.1%) compared to Republican consultants (19.8%) and slightly more Republican 
consultants (51.5%) had experience of 1-4 years compared to Democratic consultants 
(46.3).  
 Candidate Demographics.  Table 10 provides results for the characteristics of 
the candidates as reported by the consultants who responded to the survey. The value of 
the questions in this section is that we are able to see the types of candidates that the 
consultants were working with and how this may play out in later analyses in how 
consultant’s strategies might be affected.   
 There was a fairly good mix of Republican (N=85) and Democratic (N = 138) 
candidates overall which should assist in the generalizability of the results obtained from 
the rest of the survey data. In total, consultants reported that their candidates were less 
likely to be an Incumbent (28.1%) compared to a Challenger (38.0%) or in an Open Seat 
race (33.8%); candidates and their opposition were more likely to be White (84.0% 
candidate, 82.9% opposition) and Male (73.8% candidate, 82.9% opposition); most 
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sought an executive position (70.0%); war chest funds were similarly distributed between 
the candidates (41.0% and opponents 47.3%); and most reported winning (59.6%).   
 There were differences along party lines.  More of the Republicans candidates 
(36.6%) were reported to be incumbents compared to Democrats (22.8%), fewer of the 
Republican candidates were reported to be female (16.8%) compared to Democrats 
(32.1%) while opposition candidates were reported to be equally distributed between the 
parties. Fewer of the Democratic candidates (78.4%) were reported to be White compared 
to Republicans (93.1%); more of the Republican candidates sought an Executive position 
(75.2%) compared to Democrats (66.7%); more of the Republican candidates (51.2%) 
Table 10 
Candidate Demographics by Party 
 
Candidate 
Demographics 
Republicans 
N (%) 
Democrats 
N (%) 
Position Sought 
     Challenger 34 (33.7) 66 (40.7) 
      Incumbent 37 (36.6) 37 (22.8) 
      Open Seat 30 (29.7) 59 (36.4) 
Gender, My Candidate      
        Male 84 (83.2) 110 (67.9) 
        Female 17 (16.8) 52 (32.1) 
Gender, Opposition  
  
        Male 83 (82.2) 135 (83.3) 
        Female 18 (17.8)  27 (16.7) 
Race, My Candidate          
        White 94 (93.1) 127 (78.4) 
         Black 2 (2.0) 25 (15.4) 
         Hispanic 4 (4.0) 7 (4.3) 
         Other 1 (1.0) 3 (1.8) 
Race, Opposition 
        White 83 (82.2)  135 (83.3) 
         Black 10 (9.9)  17 (10.5) 
         Hispanic 7 (6.9) 7 (4.3) 
         Other 1 (1.0)  3 (1.9) 
Type of Position Sought 
         Executive 76 (75.2) 108 (66.7) 
         Legislative 25 (24.8) 54 (33.3)  
War Chest    
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         Your Opponent 33 (39.3) 72 (53.2) 
         About Even 8 (9.5) 18 (13.0) 
         Your Candidate  43 (51.2)  48 (34.8)  
Win 
          Yes 58 (68.2) 75 (54.3) 
           No 27 (31.8%) 63 (45.7) 
Total  85 (100.0) 138 (100.0) 
 
were reported as having more funds in their war chest than the Democrats (34.8%); and 
more of the Republican candidates were reported as winning (68.2%) than the Democrats 
(54.3%). 
 The District.  District characteristics are shown in Table 11.  These questions 
were included in the survey to get an idea as to how diverse the regions were that would 
be analyzed in the dissertation. In general the consultants in the survey were from the 
Midwest (25.2%) and the northeast (18.3%), and the vast majority of them reported 
working in a mixed rural and urban area (42%) more so than in cities (19.6%) or the 
country (11.4%). The majority of the consultants were in districts with 25% or fewer 
ethnic minorities (62%) but the largest minority in most of their electoral districts were 
African Americans (46.9%) followed relatively closely by Latinos (38%). The 
consultants seemed to be in districts of varying partisan intensity, with (45.7%) reporting 
working in slightly to highly Democratic districts and (43.6%) reporting working in 
slightly to highly Republican districts. Finally, consultants were asked to show where 
they were they were in the polls right after the primary, at the midway point of the 
election and how much they won or lost the final election by. The answer ranged from 1 
= “Ahead of their opponent by double digits,” to 5 = “Behind their opponent by double 
digits.” In all three questions the consultant answers skewed towards the extremes. 
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Almost equal numbers of consultants reported they were either far ahead or far behind in 
each question including the final polling results.  
Differences appeared across party lines.  From Table 11, it would appear that 
many of the Republican and Democratic consultants were working in highly hostile 
political territory. Roughly an equal number of Republican consultants reported working 
in slightly Republican (28.9%) and highly Democratic (27.7%) districts. On the 
Democratic side almost 40% of the consultants reported working in slightly to highly 
Republican leaning districts. This suggests two things, primarily for the Democrats. This 
comports with our early survey results that show close to 70% of the Democratic 
consultants in this sample are working for challengers or in open seat races. With only 
22% of the Democratic consultants working for incumbents it stands to reason that many 
of them are not working in particularly supportive areas.  
Further, there appears to be a rural versus urban difference in the survey 
respondents. More Republicans reported working in rural or mixed areas whereas 
Democratic respondents were often working in the suburbs or city areas. This might 
explain why Democrats reported working in districts with a minority population of 40% 
or more much more often than Republicans (16 to 23%).  
The respondents were primarily from the mid-west although the distributions 
differ considerably between the parties. Democrats mostly came from the mid-west, 
Pacific Northwest and West, whereas outside of the large number of mid-western 
respondents Republican consultants were fairly evenly distributed.  
Finally the last section of the table provides a sample of the polling questions in 
the survey. About equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats reported being behind or 
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ahead in the polls right after the primary election was over. So in this sample, there is a 
fairly diverse collection of campaign positions and circumstances that might affect 
consultant strategy. The question of poll position was actually asked to consultants three 
times, ‘poll position after primary’, poll position at midway point, and ‘how much your 
candidate won or lost by’.  
Table 11 
District Demographics by Party 
 
District Demographics Republicans 
N (%) 
Democrats 
N (%) 
Geographic Region 
    South 17 (20)  13 (9.4)  
    West 22 (25.8) 61 (36.9)  
    Northeast  11 (12.9)  11 (8.0)  
    Mid-Atlantic  8 (9.4)  11 (8.0)  
    Mid-West 27 (31.8)  30 (21.7)  
District Type       
  
    Rural 21 (25.3)  22 (15.7)  
    Mixed Rural and Urban 35 (42.2)  56 (40.0)  
    Suburban 17 (20.5)  29 (20.7)  
    Urban  10 (12.1)  33 (23.6)  
Minority Percentage  
  
      Less than 10% 28 (33.0) 37 (26.8) 
      10 -25%  29 (34.5)  44 (31.9)  
      26 – 40%  13 (15.5) 25 (18.1)  
      Over 40%  14 (16.6)  32 (23.1)  
Largest Minority         
  
      Black 40 (47.6) 72(52.2) 
      Latino 35(41.7) 50 (36.2) 
      Asian  7 (8.3) 9 (6.5) 
      Other 2 (2.4)  7 (5.0)  
District Preference  
  
     Very Democratic 24 (28.6) 47 (34.1)  
     Slightly Democratic 7 (8.3)  25 (18.1)  
     About Even 10 (11.9)  13 (9.4)  
     Slightly Republican 24 (28.6)  29 (21.0)  
     Very Republican 19 (22.6)  24 (17.4)  
Position in Polls After Primary    
     Behind by single to double digits  38 (44.7)  53 (38.4) 
     About Even  10 (11.8) 23 (16.7) 
     Ahead by single to double digits  37 (43.5) 62 (44.9) 
 
 65
 
Now that we have established the major characteristics of the consultants, the 
districts they worked in, and the types of candidates that they worked for, the remainder 
of this chapter will look at the specific questions posed to consultants about Candidate 
Traits, Negative Advertising, and Candidate Positioning.   
Candidate Traits 
Consultants’ ratings of candidate traits was explored in two ways: (1) in an open-
ended question, consultants were asked to identify the traits that they found to be most 
important in the candidates they worked for and (2) consultants were asked to rate the 
importance of specific traits from the research literature on a five point scale. 
Open-ended Question Results.  The open-ended question method was used in 
the hope that the survey results would give consultants more freedom than the trait 
specific questions they would answer later in the survey. Some consultants can choose 
which candidates they work for, and some are simply saddled with candidates based on 
where the state or national party directs. In many instances consultants are working for 
spouses or relatives; thus with such a wide range of circumstances it was important to see 
what consultants found as valuable as far as candidate traits.  
The most important traits ranged widely, with the ability to communicate, honesty 
and personality being the most often quoted traits. What was compelling about this 
question was that there did not appear to be any major differences in what candidate traits 
consultants considered important based on the type of election that was being run or the 
level of the election or even the years that the person has worked as a consultant. The 
only discernable difference in how consultants viewed candidate traits was based on their 
partisan identification. It was interesting to note that without prompting, many 
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consultants responded with the traits Kinder (1983) identified even before reaching those 
questions.  
 Democrats. Of the 113 Democratic consultants that answered this question, 
integrity and the ability to communicate and connect well across many different types of 
voters were the most important character traits. This applied across democratic 
challengers and incumbents and open seat consultants. Why might this be the case? One 
answer might be the Democrats are generally dealing with a more diverse constituency 
than are Republicans and thus find the candidates ability to communicate across 
constituencies to be important. But communication as an attribute could have many 
meanings in the minds of consultants. A candidate’s ability to communicate might be the 
ability to stay on message, the ability to articulate policy stances or even the ability to 
make persuasive arguments to the public. Regardless of the meaning, communication 
seems to be an unprompted important attribute in the minds of Democratic consultants in 
describing the best aspects of their candidates.  
Table 12 presents the most cited “best” candidate traits for Democrats. The 
categories and codes developed for their open ended responses were as follows:  
• Good Communicator: Any reference to the candidate’s speaking, or expression of 
ideas, policy or feelings. 
• Integrity: The specific use of the word ‘integrity’ to describe the candidate  
• Resume: Any reference to the work that the candidate had done in the past that 
was viewed positively by the consultant. This includes life achievements that may 
have had nothing to do with elective office.  
• Intelligence: Any use of the word brains, intelligence, brilliance etc.  
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• Personality: Any reference to the candidate’s general demeanor, friendliness, 
charisma or personal ticks that made them valuable in the consultant’s eyes. 
• Honesty: The specific use of the word honesty.  
 Clearly there were a large number of miscellaneous responses since with so many 
respondents developing effective codes would cut out some significant answers. However 
the main themes of the Democratic consultants’ views do come across.  
Table 12 
Most cited ‘Best trait of candidate’:  
Democratic Consultants 
Traits  Count Percent 
Good Communicator  30 26.5 
Integrity  20 17.7 
Resume 15 13.3 
Intelligence  14 12.4 
Personality 10 8.8 
Honesty 4 3.5 
Misc 20 17.7 
Total 113 100% 
 
The second most frequently cited attribute amongst the Democratic consultants in 
the survey was integrity. There were few descriptions of what integrity meant, and as we 
will see in the discussion of the Republican consultants later, there is a difference 
between integrity and honesty, at least in vocabulary.  
One other important note to mention about consultants open ended responses to 
this question, Democrats were more likely to comment on the consultant’s interaction 
with the candidate in regards to positive traits. In answering the question two consultants 
mentioned.  
• “A bottomless money bucket and a handler who was smart enough not to let his 
candidate engage in public debates or public venues where he would have to 
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respond to unscripted questions.”  (A consultant/candidate in an open seat state 
legislature race in the West. The candidate lost.) 
• “He does what he’s told, and believes in the team that brought him to the 
party.”(A consultant in an open seat race for state legislature in the West. The 
candidate won.) 
This suggests at least that consultants view their role in what makes a good candidate 
may be somewhat symbiotic. In the first comment it’s clear that the consultant’s 
statement is primarily that the candidate had a great deal of money but what’s more, the 
consultants argued that it was their ability to keep the candidate out of dangerous 
situations that helped the candidate perform well. In a similar fashion the second 
consultant suggests that the candidate was simply smart enough to let their team lead 
them.  
 Republicans. Out of the 70 Republican consultants who answered this question in 
the survey (Table 13)  the trait most often mentioned was “Resume” and there were 
several mentions of the fact that candidates were former military veterans or had worked 
in the community for years or even that candidates had successful business experience 
prior to running for office. This tendency amongst GOP consultants to mention the 
resume of their candidates might suggest stronger party ties in the candidate selection 
process. Generally, when the state or national party has a more active role in the selection 
of candidates for office resumes are more important than when candidates are more self 
selected. Note that Consultants for Republican candidates tended to mention resume and 
experience more than Democrats. 
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 Interestingly enough, honesty was the other key word for consultants, not 
‘integrity’ which was the word of choice for Democrats. Honesty in many respects may 
have more to do with direct communication with voters, i.e.: “This politician will give 
honest answers to tough questions” whereas integrity may have more to do with the 
actions that a candidate takes in office, in their personal life and even during the 
campaign. The distinction in these definitions is unclear, however the consistency of the 
results is interesting. No Democratic consultant mentioned honesty as their candidate’s 
most important attribute.  
 The general categories listed above were derived from an overall review of the 
best traits that consultants listed for their candidates. They were then distilled into the 
categories that Democratic and Republican answered were placed into. Consequently the 
categories are the same except for on additional phrase used by one Republican 
consultant (Ambition). These initial results seem to confirm the Hypothesis # 1, that 
consultants of differing partisanship would weigh the importance of traits differently.  
Table 13 
Most cited ‘Best Trait of Candidate:’ 
Republican Consultants 
 
Traits  Count Percent 
Resume 17 24.3 
Honesty  11 15.7 
Personality 8 11.4 
Intelligence 7 10.0 
Good Communicator  6 8.6 
Ambition 1 1.4 
Misc 20 28.6 
Total 70 100 
  
 The notion of governing versus campaigning is a driving force behind many of 
the candidate questions in the survey. There is very little academic research analyzing 
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this subject, and thus it seemed useful to obtain an assessment from consultants about this 
concept. Consultants were asked if they saw a correlation between the traits a candidate 
needed to run for office and the traits a candidate needed to actually govern (Table 14). 
 While a majority of consultants (61%) saw a correlation between how someone 
runs a campaign and how someone will serve in office, it is hard to ignore the 37% of 
respondents who saw no correlation at all. This is a surprising number considering the 
amount of public scrutiny that campaigns often receive and the perception promoted by 
the press and punditry of a campaign being a template for the candidate’s governing 
style. Either way, these results seem to confirm Hypothesis # 2 from the trait section, 
theorizing that consultants see a positive relationship between how a campaign is run and 
how an elected official will actually behave once in office.  
 There is no statistically significant relationship between how consultants 
answered this question and their partisan identification, the type of campaign they were 
running of the position they were seeking. However, though there was no statistically 
significant relationship, the percentages between Republican and Democratic consultants 
were about the same, with both stating they felt there was a strong correlation (59% to 
64%). The results do however comport with Thurber’s earlier work (1999) which 
suggests that most consultants have an opinion at least about the connection between 
campaigning and governing as opposed to simply working as brand managers. 
 
Table 14 
Frequency of Consultants’ Opinion about the Relationship of Candidate Traits: 
Running and Serving 
 
Survey Options 
 
Frequency 
 
Percent 
They have a very strong correlation, the way they run 
and behave in a campaign says a lot about how they 
will govern. 
122 61.3 
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They have no correlation, being a great campaigner 
says little about how you will actually govern. 
74 37.2 
I don’t know, I don’t keep up with candidates after 
the race is over. 
3 1.5 
Total 199 100.0 
  
 Predictors of Consultants’ Ratings of Candidate Traits. Having reviewed what 
consultants expressed were the most important traits in their candidates in general, as 
well as how consultants viewed the relationship between campaigning and governing, the 
multivariate analyses allow for exploration of what factors influence how consultants 
evaluate traits. Using the predictors from the literature, as well as the context of running 
or serving in office, multivariate models were constructed to identify the characteristics 
that predict consultants’ attitudes about the importance of candidate traits in this sample.  
Consultants were asked to rate the traits of “Integrity,” “Leadership,” “Empathy,” 
“Competence,” and “Ambition” on a scale of 1 to 5, with “1=Very Unimportant” to 
“5=Very Important.” Survey results showed that very few consultants rated any of the 
traits as not important, which makes sense. Not many campaign managers would ever 
admit to, let alone actually believe that Empathy or Leadership didn’t matter when 
consultants were running for office or serving as elected officials.  Since most consultants 
considered all of these traits to be important resulting in results that was highly skewed, 
each variable was dichotomized into a 1, 0 variable with 1=”Very Important” and 0= 
“Important to Unimportant”.  This recoding was performed for all candidate trait 
variables for both ‘running’ and ‘governing.’  
Binary logistic regression models were developed to identify significant 
predictors of candidate traits ratings under two conditions: the candidate is running for 
office or governing, for a total of 10 models.  The predictors were: Party (GOP = 0, 
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Democrat = 1); Party Preference in District (Very Democratic = 1 to Very Republican = 
5); Type of Race (Challenger, Open Seat, Incumbent) dummy coded with “Incumbent” as 
the comparison group; Position Sought (Executive = 1 or Legislative = 0); War Chest 
District  ( 1 = Your opponent, 2 = Even, 3 = Your candidate); Minority Percentage (Less 
than 10% = 1 to Over 55% = 5), Candidate race (1 = White, 0 = Minority); Candidate Sex 
(1 = male, 0 = female); District Education Level (1= Highly Educated to 5 = Not very 
educated); Win (1 = yes, 0 = no). 
 Results for the 10 models are summarized in Table 15 (see Appendix tables A – J 
for the complete statistical results of each model).  The initial hypotheses for significant 
predictors established for Hypothesis # 3 received some support, although by and large, 
fewer predictors were found to be significant than initially anticipated. There were 
significant predictors for six of the ten models.  Minority percentage in a district was 
found to be an important predictor for several candidate traits.  Clearly in this sample, 
minority communities demand more leadership and empathy from their candidates than 
the more mainstream majority white constituency.  
Table 15 
Significant Predictors by Candidate Trait Model  
from Logistic Regression Analyses 
 
Model 
 
Significant Predictors 
Interpretation: Trait Very 
Important if 
Integrity while running War Chest Candidate has fewer funds  
Integrity while governing None  
Empathy while running Minority Percentage 
Sex, Candidate 
Education Level 
District is a higher percent minority 
Candidate is female, education is 
higher 
Empathy while governing Win-Lose Candidate lost 
Leadership while running War Chest 
Minority Percentage 
Candidate has fewer funds 
District is a higher percent minority 
Leadership while governing Minority Percentage District is a higher percent minority 
Ambition while running Education 
Win-Lose 
District more educated 
Candidate wins  
Ambition while governing None  
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Competence while running None  
Competence while governing  None  
 
War Chest or funding also emerged as a predictor for two candidate traits.  In 
each case, fewer funds were associated with “Very Important” ratings for “Integrity” 
while running and “Leadership” while running.  This is to be expected; a candidate who 
doesn’t have much money, can essentially only run on their ‘leadership’ and ‘integrity’. 
In fact, depending on the campaign environment, the candidate with less money will 
often use this fact as a way to prove to voters that they are more sincere and less beholden 
to ‘special interests’ than the candidate who leads the way in fundraising.  
 Two additional predictors were significant for different models.  Win-Lose was a 
significant predictor for “Empathy” while governing. Consultants for winners report that 
governing with empathy is very important, perhaps indicating that they feel that once an 
election is over, the victor should set about the task of building bridges between who 
actually elected them and who worked for the opposition. Sex was a significant predictor 
for “Empathy” while running. Consultants who worked for women candidates deemed 
empathy as very important more often than those who worked with male candidates. As 
mentioned in the candidate section of the literature review, women are often seen as more 
empathetic by voters than men, but moreover, they have to work to show these traits as 
well, or they might be considered too ‘cold’ or heartless to serve.  
 Note that the position the candidate was seeking did not have a significant 
relationship with any of the traits. Literature suggests that those running for executive 
positions would care about demonstrating leadership, or integrity at least, more than 
legislative candidates but this variable was not significant in any of the models.  
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 Finally, it was very surprising that party did not have a statistically significant 
relationship with any of the candidate trait variables. Republican and Democratic 
consultants work very hard to present certain brands and archetypes about their 
characters, usually taking the lead from the president or the national party. One would 
expect leadership or integrity to come forth as significant for the GOP but neither did. At 
the end of the day this may demonstrate to us that perhaps it is not inherent traits amongst 
consultants but environmental factors (who your candidate is or their district) that drives 
belief systems.  
Negative Advertising 
 This section reports results for (1) consultant reports of the extent of negative 
advertising in their campaigns and the extent to which they and their opponents attacked 
on character or policy; (2) consultants’ definition of negative advertising, and (3) 
predictors of negative ad use. 
 Extent of Negative Advertising in Research Sample. To even begin a 
discussion of negative advertising strategy by consultants, it is first necessary to establish 
how much if any negative advertising was employed during the course of the campaigns 
covered in the survey. This question was organized into two distinct questions to cover 
not only the negative advertising run by individual campaigns but also the total ad 
environment which might include ads run by outside groups.  
 A majority of consultants reported that they were operating in a negative 
campaign environment (Table 16). About 62% of the consultants reported that negative 
advertising was run during their campaign, although not surprisingly most consultants 
claim that they were the victims (46.2%) rather than the initiators of such conflicts 
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(16.0%).  About 80% of the consultants who claimed to have attacked first were either in 
open seat races or they were challengers (data not shown).  When queried about others 
outside their campaign running negative ads, only 31% reported that no negative ads 
were run by outside groups; 30% reported outside groups ran attacks against their 
candidate; 12% reported attacks against their opponents and 24% reported attacks against 
their candidate and their opponent. 
Table 16 
Were any negative ads run during your campaign? 
 
 
Question Options Frequency Percent 
No negative ads run 85 37.8 
Yes, Opponent attacked us first 104 46.2 
Yes, Attacked our opponent first 36 16.0 
Total 225 100.0 
 
 Not surprisingly few consultants admit to attacking character during campaigns 
(24.0% mostly or always, Table 17) and yet they are much more comfortable saying that 
the character of their candidate was attacked (52.0%, mostly or always). Clearly this 
suggests that attacks on character might be a matter of interpretation, or that consultants 
simply don’t want to admit to how they are engaging their opponents. On policy issues, 
consultants reported that opponents attacked their policy (43.2%, mostly or always) less 
than they attacked their opponent’s policy issues (54.4%, mostly or always).  
 With this in mind, the survey was then examined with an analysis of feelings 
about negative advertising content distributed over party. While the results showed that 
Republicans attacked Democrats on character more than Policy the survey showed that a 
majority of the consultants reported that they “Seldom or Never” attacked their 
opponent’s character (Democrats, 54.7%; Republicans, 56.0%). About equal numbers of 
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consultants who were campaigning for an incumbent (51.6%), a challenger (55.3%) or 
were in an open seat race (58.0%) reported they seldom or sometimes attacked their 
opponent’s character. These initial results might suggest that Hypothesis # 6 which 
posited that Republicans would be more apt to admit to character attacks than Democrats 
was incorrect. However, none of these crosstabs elicited a significant relationship 
between party and the dependant variable of character or policy attacks, so at least in the 
current models these results provide little substantive evidence. 
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Table 17 
Frequency of Attack Ads for Candidate or Opponent: 
Character and Policy Positions 
Question 
Options 
Your Attack Ads Your Opponent’s Attack Ads 
Opponent’s 
Character 
N (%) 
Opponent’s 
Policy Positions 
N (%) 
Candidate’s 
Character 
N (%) 
Candidate’s 
Policy Positions 
N (%) 
 Never 53 (42.4) 26 (20.8) 15 (12.0) 23 (18.4) 
 Seldom 15 (12.0) 9 (7.2) 14 (11.2) 21 (16.8) 
 Sometimes 27 (21.6) 22 (17.6) 31 (24.8) 27 (21.6) 
 Mostly 14 (11.2) 27 (21.6) 37 (29.6) 39 (31.2) 
 Always 16 (12.8) 41 (32.8) 28 (22.4) 15 (12.0) 
 Total 125 (100.0) 125 (100.0) 125 (100.0) 125 (100.0) 
 
 From the survey results above there are a few simple observations. The first is 
that the majority of consultants in the survey claim that they don’t engage in character 
attacks on their opponents during the campaign. This transcends party, and even 
campaign position. An analysis of responses to the question: “How often did your 
opponent focus on your candidate’s character” with response options from “never” to 
“always,” provided some key insight into these results. About 52% of Democratic 
consultants and 50% of Republican consultants reported that their opponents “mostly” to 
“always” attacked their candidate’s character. So clearly we have an example of the 
inconsistencies that can result from self-reporting on an issue as volatile as negative 
advertising. Obviously someone is engaging in personal attacks during campaigns, a 
phenomenon that has been reported by academics in the literature review as well as 
citizen groups. However, consultants in this sample seem sure that all of the attacking 
must come from the opposition since they report that they are not a part of this problem 
in public discourse.  
Further analysis of the relationship between “Party” and policy attacks shows that 
about 30% of GOP consultants claim that they never attack their opponents’ policy 
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positions and 44% of Democrats claim they always attack their opponent’s policy 
positions. Clearly one side has a unique view of their own position-taking. For 
Republican consultants a curious result is found; many of them claim to never attack their 
opponent’s policy positions, and even more claim to never attack their opponent’s 
character, so the question remains what do they actually criticize their opponent about? 
Moreover, Democratic consultants seem much more emphatic in claiming they 
consistently focus on policy. It is highly likely that Republicans are either attacking 
character more often than they admit or attacking policy more often than they admit, 
because they are definitely saying something in their negative ads that, by and large they 
are not admitting to collectively in this sample. 
 Consultants’ Definitions of Negative Advertising.  The first goal of this section 
of the research was to determine if there was more consistency in the definition of 
negative advertising among political consultants, so as to possibly better explore the 
various definitions in the political science and more applied literature. In most respects 
Hypothesis # 1, for negative advertising, that consultant definitions of negative 
advertising would differ from the political science literature was supported. However in 
some cases the variations in defining negative advertising amongst consultants was 
almost as wide as that in political science. 
 Out of a total of 344 respondents who initially started the survey, there were 197 
responses to the question on negative advertising, a response rate of 57% to an optional 
and open-ended question on the survey. There were three main themes that were distilled 
from these responses about negative advertising: the first was the distinction between 
‘attack’ and ‘negative advertising’, the second, a distinction between ‘contrast’ and 
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‘attack’ advertising and finally some divergence amongst consultants about what actually 
constituted a ‘personal or character’ attack. Beyond these content themes, there were no 
differences in consultant attitudes based on party, type of race being run, or even region 
of the country. To the degree that negative advertising was defined consistently, 
consultants seemed uniform in their beliefs regardless of their place in the campaign 
fabric.  
 The distinction between ‘attack’ advertising, and negative advertising is one that 
is not often specifically stated in the political science literature but was replete in the 
responses from the consultants. Consultants in the survey made a distinction between the 
two types of ads, although the distinction often fell on the same definition. For example: 
• “Ads that emphasize negative attributes about one’s opponent. I would 
not, however, characterize these as ‘attack’ ads, which stand on their own, 
attacking the personal character of a candidate” (Media Consultant for 
Incumbent Federal Senator in the Northeast) 
• “Negative advertising exists on two planes. The first is ads which point 
out negative aspects of your opponent – his stand on an issue, failure to 
address an issue, residency, etc. The second is attacks on the opponent’s 
character, often twisting facts or only partially stating the facts to make the 
opponent appear other than he is.” (Campaign Manager for White 
Challenger for Federal House seat in Midwest) 
These two responses are reflective of the general attitude expressed by consultants in the 
survey. Arguably, ads that make the distinction between the personal and the professional 
are critical in the minds of most consultants. Some refer to unethical ads as ‘attack’ ads, 
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and acceptable ads as ‘negative’ and in the case of the respondents above the roles are 
reversed. Regardless the notion that there are acceptable and non-acceptable types of ads, 
is helpful in finding a possible definition.  
 The second theme and perhaps most consistent was the definition of what 
constitutes a negative ad. Some consultants felt they could determine negative advertising 
in the field but that it lacked a specific definition: 
• “You know it when you see it.” (Manager for Female Incumbent in State 
Legislature in the West) 
• “It’s like pornography, I’m not sure, but I know it when I see it.” 
(Manager for Male Open Seat State Legislature Candidate in Pacific 
Northwest)  
Most consultants viewed negative advertising as either attacking the personal life and 
character of a candidate or lying.  
• “Character Assassination” (Manager for Male Challenger for City Council 
Seat in Southeast) 
• “Negative advertising is the use of exposing certain embarrassing facts 
about a candidate’s personal life, whether true or untrue. Also can be the 
intention distortion of fact in order to cast the candidate in a negative light. 
By negative I mean in a way that is distasteful to the community and 
community norms.” (Manager for Male Open Seat Candidate for State 
legislature) 
 What is interesting however is that this is a critical distinction in negative 
advertising definitions on the part of managers and political consultants. A campaign can 
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put many things in ads that are demonstrably true but personal in nature about the 
opposition. While many consultants seem to believe this is unfair, there were at least a 
number who believed sincerely in the personal behavior being a significant part of the 
campaign attack strategy so long as the words were true. 
• “Negative Advertising is only ‘negative’ when it is untrue. Otherwise, it’s 
all fair game.” (GOTV organizer for Incumbent President) 
• “If an opponent has committed acts that are immoral or illegal, etc., then 
bringing that to the attention of voters is justified. Negative attacks ads are 
otherwise immoral and corrupt the system. I would not use such false 
attacks in order to win votes. “ (Candidate/ manager for Open Seat race in 
State Legislature in the West).  
 It would appear that any other aspect of the candidate is considered fair game, 
from their past associations, to their voting records, but personal attacks are deemed off 
limits by just about all consultants.  
 Finally consultants were adamant about explaining the difference between attack 
ads and contrast ads. Contrast ads were generally deemed as fine, no matter how harsh 
they became because the ads included both candidates. In fact, when using contrast ads, 
personal character traits were often mentioned, as candidates attempted to define 
themselves as having shown more integrity, or character throughout their careers.  
 So, with the results above there are a few key conclusions that can be made. 
Political consultants may not be any more exact in their definition of negative advertising 
than political scientists but there are some consistent themes in the profession. Lying 
about one’s opponent, and mentioning any personal or family issues that have no direct 
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bearing on the campaign at hand are deemed as out of bounds or negative advertising.  
Most other topics, and of course variations on those topics are deemed within bounds. 
More importantly, while issues may be the topic that most consultants say is the most 
appropriate for negative advertising, it is nonetheless character attacks and concerns 
about them that drive more of consultant behavior. 
  Predictors of Negative Advertising Use.  Consultants for candidates responded 
to questions about the extent to which they used negative ads to attack the character or 
policy of their opponent, as well as the extent to which their opponents used negative ads 
to attack their candidate.  The goal of this section is to analyze the relationship between 
predictors established in the literature review and the beliefs and attitudes of political 
consultants in this sample. More importantly the goal is to assess how these results relate 
to the hypotheses established in Chapter 2. Significant predictors were identified in a 
series of binary logistic  regression models with each dependent variable measuring the 
extent to which consultants reported they used negative ads to attack, coded as 1= Mostly 
to Always and 0 = Seldom to Never.  
The predictor variables were Party type (GOP = 0, Dem = 1), Position Sought 
(1 = Executive, 0 = Legislative), the extent to which the polls showed the consultant’s 
candidate was ahead (1 = “Behind by double digits” to 5 = “Ahead by double digits”) at 
the beginning of the campaign (Primary) and midway through the campaign. The “Type 
of Race” (Challenger, Open Seat, Incumbent) was dummy coded so that “Incumbent” 
was the comparison group for both “Challenger” and “Open Seat” candidates.   
 Several binary logistic regression models used the same predictor variables 
described above, but included a new predictor variable to focus on the impact of attacks 
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themselves on candidates’ and consultants’ attack strategies. The survey asked 
consultants to answer not only whether they attacked character or policy, but also 
whether they were attacked with character or policy themed ads. Regressions were 
performed with the ‘attack’ variable included as a predictor for a more realistic view of 
attack strategy when other campaigns are in play and to determine what if anything might 
drive policy attacks during campaigns.  The variables “Opponents attack Character” and 
“Opponents attack Policy” (Coded 1 – 5) were added to hold constant the extent to which 
consultants reported their candidate was being attacked. 
 The first three regression models focus on character attacks (Tables 18, 19, 20).  
Table 18 presents the results of a logistic regression on the dependant variable of how 
likely a candidate is to attack their opponent’s character. The only significant predictor 
associated with character attacks is where the candidate found themselves in the polls at 
the midway point of the political campaign. Consultants for candidates who were further 
ahead in the polls were less likely to report that they attacked their opponent on character.  
This suggests that those candidates who feel that they have a comfortable lead may feel 
less inclined to pay any attention to their opponent, let alone launch negative attacks on 
them. More importantly polls drive negative advertising behavior, and the fact that 
candidates who find themselves ahead in the polls tend not to attack character might 
suggest that those who are far behind consider character attacks a key part of their 
arsenal.  
 Several predictors were not significant, although it was predicted they would be. 
For example, “Party,” (GOP/DEM) did not have any relationship as to whether or not a 
campaign attacked the opposition on character, at least in these results. This goes against 
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both anecdotal and some academic research on content of negative ads in many political 
campaigns. 
Table 18 
Predictors for How Likely A Candidate is to Attack 
Their Opponent’s Character 
 
Model B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/Dem) -.165 .473 .121 1 .728 .848 
Position Sought (Exec/Legislative) -.268 .503 .285 1 .594 .765 
Challenger vs Incumbent -.906 .718 1.593 1 .207 .404 
Open Seat vs Incumbent -.152 .598 .064 1 .800 .859 
Polls Midway -.910 .356 6.528 1 .011* .402 
Polls Primary .449 .304 2.179 1 .140 1.566 
Constant 1.093 1.092 1.003 1 .316 2.984 
 
 
 Table 19 provides results for the model of how likely a candidate is to attack their 
opponents’ character when controlling for policy attacks by their opponent.  The only 
significant predictor was “Polls Midway,” with candidates more likely to attack the 
further behind in the polls they were at midway in the campaign.   
 
Table 19 
 Predictors of How Likely a Candidate is to Attack Character  
When Their Policies Were Attacked 
 
Model B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/Dem) -.279 .484 .333 1 .564 .756 
Position Sought (Exec/Legislative) -.437 .526 .692 1 .405 .646 
Challenger vs Incumbent -.898 .721 1.551 1 .213 .407 
Open Seat vs Incumbent .034 .618 .003 1 .956 1.035 
Polls Midway -.995 .373 7.106 1 .008* .370 
Polls Primary .430 .311 1.903 1 .168 1.537 
Opponent Attacks Policy .274 .200 1.867 1 .172 1.315 
Constant .765 1.128 .460 1 .497 2.150 
 
 
 Table 20 presents results for the model of how likely a candidate is to attack their 
opponents’ character when controlling for character attacks by their opponent.  Similar to 
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the previous models, the only significant predictor was “Polls Midway,” with candidates 
more likely to attack the further behind in the polls they were at midway in the campaign.  
Holding constant opponents’ attacks on character or policy did not have an effect on the 
predictors in the regression model. 
 
Table 20 
 Predictors of How Likely a Candidate is to Attack Character  
When Their Character Was Attacked 
  
Model B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/Dem) -.155 .474 .107 1 .744 .856 
Position Sought (Exec/Legislative) -.241 .509 .224 1 .636 .786 
Challenger vs Incumbent -.872 .728 1.433 1 .231 .418 
Open Seat vs Incumbent -.191 .607 .099 1 .753 .826 
Polls Midway -.890 .362 6.037 1 .014* .411 
Polls Primary .441 .312 1.996 1 .158 1.554 
Opponent Attacks Character 
-.188 .172 1.196 1 .274 .829 
Constant 1.637 1.213 1.820 1 .177 5.137 
 
 
 The next three regression models focus on policy attacks (Tables 21, 22, 23).  
Table 21 presents the results of a logistic regression on the dependant variable of how 
likely a candidate is to attack their opponent’s policy.  Three predictors were significant: 
“Party,” with consultants for Democratic candidates more likely to report using negative 
ads to attack their opponent’s policy; “Polls Primary,” with candidates who were ahead in 
the polls less likely to attack policy; and “Polls Midway” where candidates who were 
ahead in the polls at the midway of the campaign were more likely to say that they 
attacked policy. These results comport with the research literature that suggests that the 
primacy of poll positions in how attack strategies are formulated.  
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Table 21 
Predictors for How Likely a Candidate is to Attack  
Their Opponent’s Policy 
 
Model B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/Dem) 1.207 .441 7.511 1 .006 3.344 
Position Sought (Exec/Legislative) .494 .469 1.108 1 .292 1.639 
Challenger vs Incumbent .691 .644 1.150 1 .284 1.995 
Open Seat vs Incumbent .060 .529 .013 1 .910 1.062 
Polls Midway .879 .382 5.291 1 .021 2.410 
Polls Primary -1.005 .340 8.747 1 .003 .366 
Constant -1.129 1.031 1.199 1 .274 .323 
 
 
 Table 22 has added the variable “Opponents Attack Character” as a predictor to 
determine if holding this variable constant had an effect on the regression model.  In this 
model, the predictors from the previous model were significant and two additional 
predictors were significant.   
 As with the previous model, two significant predictors were “Party,” with 
Democrats more likely to attack their opponent’s policy when their character is attacked, 
as well as “Polls Primary,” with candidates who were behind in the polls at the beginning 
of the campaign more likely to attack their opponent’s policy when their character was 
attacked.  One additional predictor was also significant and “Polls Midway,” with 
candidates behind in the polls midway through the campaign less likely to attack their 
opponent’s policy when controlling for character attacks.    
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Table 22 
Predictors for How Likely a Candidate is to Attack Their Opponent’s Policy  
When attacked on Character  
 
Model B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/Dem) 1.211 .441 7.538 1 .006 3.358 
Position Sought (Exec/Legislative) .501 .470 1.137 1 .286 1.650 
Challenger vs Incumbent .705 .646 1.189 1 .275 2.023 
Open Seat vs Incumbent .049 .530 .009 1 .926 1.051 
Polls Midway .885 .382 5.358 1 .021 2.423 
Polls Primary -1.006 .339 8.797 1 .003 .366 
Opponent Attacks Character 
-.053 .160 .108 1 .742 .949 
Constant -.979 1.127 .755 1 .385 .376 
 
 
 Table 23 has added the variable “Opponents Attack Policy” as a predictor to 
determine if holding this variable constant had an effect on the regression model.  Three 
predictors were significantly associated with how likely a candidate is to use policy 
attacks when they, themselves, are attacked on policy.  The results for “Party” showed 
that Democrats attacked on policy more than Republicans when controlling for policy 
attacks by opponents.  “Polls Primary” showed that being behind in the polls at the 
beginning of the campaign was associated with more policy attacks by the candidate, 
controlling for policy attacks by opponents. “Polls Midway” showed that being behind in 
the polls at the midway point in the campaign made a candidate less likely to attack on 
policy. Note that this model is very similar to the initial “policy” model (Table 21) that 
does not hold opponents’ policy attacks constant. 
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Table 23 
Predictors for How Likely a Candidate Is to Attack Their Opponent’s Policy 
When attacked on Policy 
 
Model B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/Dem) 1.160 .446 6.768 1 .009 3.190 
Position Sought (Exec/Legislative) .426 .477 .798 1 .372 1.531 
Challenger vs Incumbent .698 .646 1.167 1 .280 2.009 
Open Seat vs Incumbent .149 .544 .075 1 .784 1.161 
Polls Midway .859 .383 5.034 1 .025 2.361 
Polls Primary -1.031 .344 8.968 1 .003 .357 
Opponent Attacks Policy .135 .182 .548 1 .459 1.144 
Constant -1.314 1.058 1.542 1 .214 .269 
 
 
 In summary, character attacks by the candidate, whether controlling for attacks by 
opponents or not, consistently showed one significant predictor – “Polls Midway” 
(Tables 18, 19, 20). Candidates behind in the polls midway through their campaigns were 
more likely to attack the character of their opponents.  This result reaffirms Hypothesis # 
2 which posited that being behind in the polls would drive campaigns to employ more 
negative advertising.  
 However, policy attacks did not show as consistent a pattern (Tables 21, 22, 23).  
“Party,” was a significant predictor in all three models, with Democrats more likely to 
attack policy whether or not their opponents’ attacks were held constant.  ”Polls Primary” 
was significant in all three models, with candidates who were behind in the polls at the 
beginning of the campaign more likely to attack policy whether or opponents’ attacks 
were held constant.  Finally, “Polls Midway” was significant in all three models with 
candidates behind in the polls less likely to attack on policy at the midpoint than 
candidates who are ahead. 
 Comparing the results from these regressions models adds some insight to what 
may actually motivate policy attacks in the campaign environment. First, it would appear 
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that there is some support for the main hypothesis posited for negative advertising in 
Chapter 2. By and large Hypothesis # 2 was supported, those candidates who found 
themselves behind in the polls, tended to attack their opponents more whether it was on 
policy or character. Hypothesis # 3, that the position candidates were seeking would have 
an impact on their negative advertising strategy received no support from the results, 
which is surprising given the increased scrutiny that often comes in campaigns for high 
executive offices. Hypothesis # 4 received mixed support from the results. Overall 
Democrats are less likely to attack than Republicans, but when Democrats do attack they 
are more likely to attack on policy. Hypothesis # 5, which posited that the type of 
election, be it Challenger, Incumbent or Open Seat, would have an impact on negative 
advertising strategy, was not supported by the results. Finally, Hypothesis # 6, which was 
similar in some respects to Hypothesis # 2 received mixed support from the data. The 
hypothesis posited that Republicans would be more likely to admit to character attacks 
and there would be no difference in policy attacks. Which some results suggested that 
Republicans likely are more inclined to attack character, there were not statistically 
significant. Moreover, there was a significant difference in how differing partisans 
attacked policy, which Democrats being more policy oriented in their attacks that 
Republicans.  
Having delved specifically into hypothesis relationship to the results we now turn 
to general discussions of these results and how they relate to negative advertising. 
Consultants for Democratic candidates still report that they are more likely to attack 
policy than Republicans and those campaigns that were ahead of their opponents in the 
polls are generally less likely to launch any kind of attack against their opponent. 
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However when putting more of a focus on policy attacks, in particular when character 
attacks are controlled for provides some interesting insight into current attack theory in 
political science. Moreover the importance of policy attacks seems to be highest at the 
beginning of the race in this sample. Political consultants in the sample consistently 
reported being more likely to attack on policy when behind right after the primary, but 
less likely to attack on policy as the race goes to the midway point.  Perhaps this suggests 
that campaigns are more likely to need to define who they are early in the campaign 
process, and when the polling situation might become more dire later on, they resort to 
more poignant attacks on character. When controlling for character attacks, several 
predictors become significant suggesting that character attacks may have a more 
significant impact on the campaign environment than policy attacks. This is of particular 
note since in many cases research has suggested that voters are more likely to make 
inferences about policy from character, than they are to make inferences about character 
from policy.  
Candidate Position 
 The analysis of consultant beliefs on candidate position strategy relied on two 
unique but related aspects of campaign politics, how strongly wedded political 
consultants feel to policy positions in certain areas, and how consultants envision their 
candidate position strategy. This results section analyzes: consultant beliefs about issue 
ownership; the impact of this concept on candidate positioning; and the degree to which 
the directional or the proximity model reflects the campaign position strategies of 
political consultants.  
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 Issue Ownership. Issue ownership literature is based on the basic proposition that 
there are certain issues that voters believe one party ‘handles’ better than another party, 
and therefore ‘owns’ that particular issue. This ownership however is composed of 
several factors; a party does not simply own an issue in voters’ minds by making public 
policy statements on that particular issue.  
 There are more or less four components commonly referred to in issue ownership 
literature.  The first is that the party has a record of ‘success’ in the minds of voters when 
handling problems associated with that issue (Norpoth and Buchannan, 1992). For 
example, successful military ventures by the United States have often come under 
Republican presidencies and therefore the GOP is more often thought to ‘own’ that 
particular issue. The next two elements are the amount of time a particular party spends, 
and media attention paid to a party’s stances on a particular issue. The Democratic Party 
has consistently championed raising the minimum wage and increasing social spending 
for the last 40 years and the press coverage of Democratic efforts in this area are fairly 
consistent.  Thus Democrats tend to ‘own’ domestic policy issues.  
 Finally, the consistency with which a party takes a position on a particular 
problem or issue is the component of issue ownership that is most important for this 
research. Parties, and by extension consultants, have an advantage when the problems 
that concern the public fall within their perceived ‘owned’ issues (Petrocik, 1996). And 
part of this stems from how consistent the party has been in not only successfully 
handling the issue but in how consistent those positions and successes have been.  
Consequently an issue that is ‘owned’ by a particular party is one that candidates and 
consultants in that party should feel particularly wedded to and thus less likely to stray 
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from their party’s perceived stances on that issue. In short, if a particular party ‘owns’ an 
issue they should be less willing to alter their positions on that issue than a party that does 
not ‘own’ the issue. 
 It was assumed in this research that movement in the campaign on issues should 
be rare, because it carries political consequences. Therefore the first question of this 
analysis is whether or not candidates actually moved on issues during the campaign.  The 
question was asked three different ways in order to capture as much information as 
possible. The questions were: (1) “Occasionally candidates adjust policy stances during 
the general election campaign. Which of the following best describes your candidate?” 
(Table 24); (2) “What were the main reasons why your candidate shifted on issues?” 
(Table 25); and (3) “If your candidate adjusted policy positions during the campaign 
which of these policy areas did they shift positions on? (Table 26).” 
 There was one resounding answer to all three questions: Candidates did not shift 
positions on issues. With corresponding responses of 83.6% (Table 24), 84.1% (Table 25) 
and 82.5% (Table 26), consultants answered each of these questions with “My candidate 
did not shift on any issues during the campaign”. This seemed to hold fast regardless of 
party and type of election as well. In the few instances where consultants admitted that 
their candidates adjusted on issues it was usually cultural issues and having to explain 
votes.  
 For example, in an optional answer to the second question, one consultant wrote: 
“His campaign staff advised him to change 55 answers on an on-line survey because they 
thought he might look ‘too liberal.” Another consultant admitted “We did have to 
‘reframe’ how he explained some votes, like voting against the gay marriage 
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amendment.”  Some consultants responded to this question and spoke more of their 
message than their positions per say. One consultant admitted that they didn’t so much 
change positions as focus on another issue since discussing trade policy polled better 
amongst voters than discussing tax policy.  
 
Table 24 
Frequency of Policy Stance Adjustment 
 
Policy Stance Adjustment Frequency Percent 
 Moved Far Left 2 1.1 
 Moved Slightly Left 13 6.9 
 Stayed same throughout the race 158 83.6 
 Moved Slightly Right 15 7.9 
 Move Far Right 1 .5 
 Total 189 100.0 
 
 
Table 25 
What were the main reasons why your candidate shifted on issues? 
Reasons for Change in Position 
 
 
Reasons 
 
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Presented with new information that 
changed our position 
11 5.8 
The opposition took a new position and we 
changed to counter it 
6 3.2 
Our stance was unpopular and hurting us 
in the polls  
11 5.8 
My candidate did not shift on any issues  159 84.1 
Other 2 1.1 
Total  187 100 
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Table 26 
If your candidate adjusted policy positions during the campaign,  
which of these policy areas did they shift positions on? 
 
Policy Area Shift Frequency Percent 
Foreign Policy 6 3.2 
Jobs 2 1.1 
Taxes 7 3.7 
Social Cultural issues 16 8.5 
No Position Changes 156 82.5 
Other 2 1.1 
Total 189 100 
 
 
 Predictors for Difficulty in Changing Policy Positions. After a review of 
campaign literature on issue ownership five key issue categories which are common in 
political campaigns were chosen as the focus of this analysis: Foreign Policy; Social and 
Cultural Issues; Jobs; Taxes; and Education. On each of these issues, consultants were 
asked to scale how problematic it would be for a candidate to change policy positions on 
that issue on a scale of 1 = Not problematic at all to 5 = Extremely problematic.  
 Five models were examined to consider how problematic consultants felt it was to 
move on particular policy issues. The dependant variable in each case was dichotomized, 
with ‘Extremely Problematic” = 1 and “Somewhat to Extremely Unproblematic” = 0. 
 The predictors in the models were established by the literature review of 
positioning in chapter 2: Party (GOP = 0, Democrat = 1); Type of Race (Challenger, 
Open Seat, Incumbent) dummy coded with “Incumbent” as the comparison group; 
Position Sought (Executive = 1 or Legislative = 0); Party Preference in District (Very 
Democratic = 1 to Very Republican = 5); and Poll Midway (1 = Behind by single or 
double digits; 2 = about even;, 3 = Ahead by single or double digits); and whether the 
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candidate won (=1) or Lost (=0).  The results of the models are presented in Table 27 and 
the entire set of tables can be viewed in the Appendix.  
The results suggest that issues on which parties most resist position changes are 
issues that the party is normally thought to ‘own’. Party identification was a significant 
predictor for three issues (Table 27). Consultants for Republican candidates are more 
likely to report that changing on foreign policy, taxes or social and cultural issues is 
extremely problematic controlling for other factors. While this work is exploratory in 
nature, this result seems to comport with commonly held beliefs about the Republican 
Party. Much of the national and local party has staked its political fortune on positions 
about the war in Iraq and therefore changing on homeland security or other key issues 
would likely be seen as a major problem.  
District preference was significant for two issues, Education and Jobs, while Type 
of Race (Challenger vs Incumbent) was a significant predictor for one issue, Education. 
Consultants in Democratic leaning districts were more likely to report that changing 
positions on Jobs or Education was very problematic compared to those in Republican 
leaning districts, and challengers were more likely than incumbents to report that it was 
very problematic to change positions on Education. Clearly partisanship either, of the 
consultant’s campaign or of the campaign district comes into play when it comes to issue 
ownership, but the pressure of partisanship seems to differ in how it manifests. On 
Republican issues it appears that the partisanship alone is enough to make changing 
positions on ‘owned issues’ a risk, while for Democrats it is the district preference that 
holds more sway. This might suggest that while Republicans as a party seem to have 
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more ideological discipline within their campaigns Democrats may have more freedom, 
or be more constrained by district context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27 
Significant Predictors by Difficulty of Changing Policy Stances Model from Logistic 
Regression Analysis 
 
 
Model 
 
Significant Predictors 
Interpretation: Very 
Problematic to change policy if 
Foreign Policy  Party Identification The candidate is Republican 
Taxes Party Identification The candidate is Republican 
Social/Cultural Issues Party Identification The candidate is Republican 
Education District Party Preference 
Type of Race 
In a Democratic -leaning District 
The candidate is a Challenger 
Jobs District Party Preference In a Democratic - Leaning District 
 
Directional vs Proximity. Having established that movement on issues carries 
some consequence in the minds of political consultants we will now move to a discussion 
of the two main theories of political positioning (Directional and Proximity models). The 
underlying assumption based on the literature is that the role of the median is significant  
to both models though for differing reasons. The proximity model argues that the primary 
determinant in gaining votes is the distance between the candidate’s policy positions and 
that of the median voter. The shorter the distance, the more likely to gain those votes, the 
further the distance, the less likely they are to gain those votes. The directional theory 
argues that the median voter is basically neutral on most policy issues and does not hold 
particularly intense feelings one way or another. The only issue that they are deeply 
concerned about is whether the policy proposed by the candidate is ‘responsible’.  
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The importance of these two theoretical views of the median voter, and voters in 
general truly play out in three very specific types of election districts, centrist districts, 
and those that lean slightly to the right (and where a Republican is running) and districts 
that lean slightly to the left (where a Democrat is running.) In a centrist district where 
most of the voters are assumed to be around the center, proximity theory would argue that 
the way to win the election would be to place oneself as close to the median as possible, 
and consequently there would be a great deal of tension between seeking one’s base and 
pleasing the median voter. The directional theory, which posits that the median voter is 
fairly neutral, suggests that a candidate can be successful taking an intense stand to the 
left, right or close to the median voter so long as they policy and candidate are viewed as 
responsible. Ultimately, the directional theory suggests there should be no tension 
between seeking the median voter and pleasing the base.  
In the case of districts that lean only slightly to the left, or slightly to the right, the 
directional theory would suggest that candidates place themselves intensely in the 
direction that the district leans. The proximity model would advise that candidate try to 
position themselves as close to the center as possible. The amount of tension that 
consultants feel should be a good indicator of which theory most approximates their 
behavior.  Both theories would suggest real tension when Democrats are running in right 
of center district, or Republicans are running in left of center district. And finally, neither 
theory would suggest marked tension in districts that are clearly left with Democrat 
candidates or clearly right with Republican candidates. 
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To capture as much information about consultant’s behavior in relation to the 
directional or proximity models, questions comparing the two models were asked three 
different ways. The first question sought out consultant’s general beliefs about directional 
versus proximity theory,”  
In planning a campaign strategy some consultants feel there is a clear tension 
 between developing a strategy that pleases the base and one that can win over the 
 swing voter. Others feel that these goals are entirely compatible. In general how 
 much tension do you feel there is in developing a strategy that pleases the base 
 and developing a strategy to win over the swing voter? “  
 The second question sought out consultant’s beliefs about directional versus 
proximity positioning strategy in their own campaign,  
 “Now consider your campaign. How much tension did you feel there was between 
 pleasing the base and winning over the swing voter?”  
These questions were scaled 1 -5 with 1 = “No tension these goals are entirely 
compatible” and 5 = “Incompatible, if one pleases the base, one alienates swing voters.”  
 The last question sought a shorter less nuanced answer on seeking out the median 
or one’s base voters. The two options for this question were 1 = Cater to one’s base and 2 
= seek the centrist voter.  
 What was your candidate's strategic motivation on most issue positions?  
 The results from the first two survey questions (Tables 28, 29) showed no 
significant relationship between Party and responses to the survey options. Republican 
and Democratic consultants showed almost identical answers regarding the tension 
between pleasing their based and alienating swing voters. In general, Republican 
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consultants expressed less concern about catering to their base and alienating the swing 
voter, but expressed slightly more tension in their own campaigns. Similarly, Democratic 
consultants expressed that there was slightly more tension between catering to their base 
and swing voters than the Republicans but the differences were relatively small and not 
statistically significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28 
Responses to Survey Question:  
In general how much tension do you feel there is in developing a strategy that pleases the 
base and developing a strategy to win over the swing voter? 
 
 
 
Survey Options 
Party  
Total 
N (%) 
GOP 
N (%) 
Dem 
N (%) 
No tension, these goals are entirely compatible 10 (11.9%) 13 (9.4%) 23 (10.4%) 
Little tension, trade-offs exist, but by and large the 
goals are compatible 
34 (40.5%) 40 (29.0%) 74 (33.3%) 
Modest tension, clear trade-offs exist, but they are 
not severe 
30 (35.7%) 63 (45.7%) 93 (41.9%) 
High tension, strong trade-offs exist 9 (10.7%) 19 (13.8%) 28 (12.6%) 
Incompatible, if one pleases the base, one alienates 
swing voters 
1 (1.2%) 3 (2.2%) 4 (1.8%) 
Total 84 (100.0%) 138 (100.0%) 222 (100.0%) 
   Chi-square = 4.277, df= 4, p< = .370 
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Table 29 
Responses to Survey Question: 
Now consider your campaign. How much tension did you feel there was between 
pleasing the base and winning over the swing voter? 
   
 Survey Options 
Party 
Total 
N (%) 
GOP 
N (%) 
Dem 
N (%) 
No tension, these goals were entirely compatible  18 (21.4%) 30 (21.7%) 48 (21.6%) 
Little tension, trade-offs existed, but by and large 
the goals were compatible  
38 (45.2%) 51 (37.0%) 89 (40.1%) 
Modest tension, clear trade-offs existed, but they 
were not severe  
20 (23.8%) 41 (29.7%) 61 (27.5%) 
High tension, strong trade-offs existed  6 (7.1%) 13 (9.4%) 19 (8.6%) 
Incompatible, any effort to please the base, 
alienated swing voters  
2 (2.4%) 3 (2.2%) 5 (2.3%) 
 Total 84 (100.0%) 138 (100.0%) 222 (100.0%) 
Chi-square = 1.884, df= 4, p< = .757 
 
  
 As shown in Table 30, there is an amazing symmetry to the responses among 
consultants to this question. With almost precisely the same percentages Republicans 
claim to have sought out their base (61.9%) while Democrats sought out centrist voters 
(61.9%). This may speak to an overall belief in the reliability of Democratic voters; many 
studies have shown that in general, the Democratic base is not necessarily as reliable 
when it comes to voter mobilization as the Republican base. Results showed a significant 
relationship between party and positioning. Democrats sought out the swing voter, and 
Republicans sought out their base, consonant with the more nuanced questions presented 
before. Thus far the results seem to suggest that partisanship might incline candidates to 
one model or another.  
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Table 30 
Did you seek your base or the centrist voter by Party 
 Position  
Party 
GOP 
N (%) 
Dem 
N (%) 
 Seek the Centrist Voter 24 (38.1)  65 (61.3)  
  Cater to the Base 39 (61.9)  41 (38.7)  
Total 63 (100.0%) 106 (100.0%) 
         Chi-square = 8.55, df= 1, p< = .003 
 
Predictors of Candidate Positioning.  The literature on political consultants 
provides several potential predictors of consultants’ reports about how they positioned 
themselves during campaigns. The first two positioning questions which were initially 
scaled from 1 to 5 with 1 = little or no tension and 5 = that pleasing the base and the 
swing voter was an incompatible goal were re-coded. This variable was re-coded to a 
dichotomous variable in which 1 = Little or no tension and 0 = Moderate tension to 
incompatible. The second question was similarly recoded (1 = cater to the base, 0 = 
centrist position).   
Binary logistic regression models were developed to measure the relationship of 
the following predictors with the dependant variables on position strategy. The predictors 
were: Party (GOP = 0, Democrat = 1); Type of Race (Challenger, Open Seat, Incumbent) 
dummy coded with “Incumbent” as the comparison group; Position Sought (Executive = 
1 or Legislative = 0); Minority Percentage (Less than 10% = 1 to Over 55% = 5), Party 
Preference in District (Very Democratic = 1 to Very Republican = 5); and Poll Midway 
(1 = Behind by single or double digits, 2 = about even, 3 = Ahead by single or double 
digits). 
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 When controlling for other factors, there were some slight differences in the 
assessments of consultants depending on if one was talking about their particular election 
and elections in general (Table 31). In the unique elections that consultants worked in, 
few of the major predictors, particularly party were significant. But the indirect party 
measure, the partisan preference of the district was significant. Consultants that worked 
in Republican-leaning districts reported that they were less likely to see tension between 
pleasing the base and seeking the swing voter than were consultants working in more 
Democratic-leaning districts.  
Table 31 
Directional versus Proximity In Your Campaign 
Consultants’ Perception of Tension in Pleasing the Base and Swing Voter 
 
Model B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Challenger vs. Incumbent -.559 .417 1.796 1 .180 .572 
Open Seat vs Incumbent -.175 .376 .217 1 .641 .839 
Party Preference District .280 .108 6.692 1 .010 1.323 
Minority Percentage .178 .126 1.995 1 .158 1.195 
Party (GOP/Dem) -.275 .304 .821 1 .365 .759 
Poll Midway .122 .193 .400 1 .527 1.130 
Constant -.521 .744 .490 1 .484 .594 
 
 
 When looking at the results for campaigns in general the results were somewhat 
similar to the campaign specific question with more significant predictors (Table 32). 
Only two predictors were significant at the .05 level. Consultants working in districts 
with higher minority populations expressed they felt less tension, and consultants 
working in districts that trended Republican in partisan preference expressed there was 
less tension between pleasing their base and seeking the swing voter. While slightly 
nonsignificant, (p<.057) consultants working for Democrats were more likely to report 
that there was tension between pleasing the base and the swing voter than consultants 
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working for Republicans, which comports with the univariate models and the initial 
survey responses.  
Table 32 
Directional versus Proximity in General 
Consultants’ Perception of Tension in Pleasing the Base and Swing Voter 
 
Model B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Challenger vs. Incumbent -.035 .449 .006 1 .937 .965 
Open Seat vs Incumbent -.602 .388 2.409 1 .121 .548 
Party Preference District .232 .119 3.823 1 .051 1.261 
Minority Percentage .501 .144 12.172 1 .000 1.651 
Poll Midway .065 .205 .101 1 .751 1.067 
Party (GOP/Dem) -.625 .328 3.629 1 .057 .535 
Constant -1.333 .811 2.700 1 .100 .264 
 
 
  The results in Table 33 suggest how the consultants managed their candidates on 
the key issue of catering to the base or the centrist voter. The dependent variable for this 
analysis, was: “Cater to the Base” = 1, else = 0. Controlling for other variables, 
Democrats were less likely than Republicans to cater to their base, which is consonant 
with the univariate table presented earlier in this chapter. This gives more credence to the 
suggestion that Republicans might have a stronger or more consistent base to turn to 
during elections than Democrats even when controlling for type of election and other key 
elements. The lack of significance for election type is surprising, given that one would 
expect incumbency and challenger status to make a difference in how candidates position 
themselves.  
 A second predictor, minority percentage, was significant. The more minority 
voters in the district the more likely the candidate is to cater to their base. Perhaps this is 
because minority voters can be trusted to vote more in a block than white voters, or 
perhaps these results are capturing candidates that have particularly strong GOTV efforts 
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and thus know that they can turn out large voters. The importance of the minority 
percentage of voters in various models suggests that perhaps further study might examine 
consultant strategies in districts with large minority populations.  
Table 33 
Predictors for “Cater to the Base” 
Model B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM) -1.146 .365 9.856 1 .002 .318 
Challenger vs Incumbent -.790 .500 2.492 1 .114 .454 
Open Seat vs Incumbent -.277 .434 .407 1 .523 .758 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) .000 .378 .000 1 .999 1.000 
Minority Percentage .372 .145 6.598 1 .010 1.451 
District Party Preference -.047 .202 .055 1 .814 .954 
Poll Midway .351 .231 2.306 1 .129 1.420 
Constant -.541 .933 .336 1 .562 .582 
 
 
Divergent Theory Predictions in Specified Districts 
The initial discussion above was focused on the main hypothesis of the position 
section, namely whether or not there was any statistically discernable relationship 
between established predictors in the literature and consultants’ tendencies to seek the 
center voter or please the base. Having established that there are statistically significant 
relationships between some predictors and the tendency towards one strategy or another, 
this section will focus on one particular predictor, the partisanship of the district in which 
the consultant’s are operating.   
Directional and proximity theories primarily diverge on their issue position 
predictions based on the type of district in which a candidate/consultant is operating. The 
districts where the theories differ most noticeably are in districts that are about evenly 
balanced in partisanship and those districts that lean slightly in favor of the candidate. In 
a district that is evenly split in partisanship, the Proximity model argues that the 
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candidate should place themselves precisely at the median (swing voters) position so as 
to capture that voter and thus guarantee victory, whereas the Directional model argues 
that it does not matter what issue strategy a candidate follows leaving candidates free to 
seek the base 
In the case of candidates/ consultants finding themselves in districts that are only 
slightly in their favor, again the theories make different predictions for candidate position 
success. The proximity model would again argue that the candidate place themselves at  
the median voter position, even if that median position has shifted slightly in their favor. 
The directional model suggests that the candidate should take a strong position in the 
direction of their own party so long as they do not step outside the region of 
responsibility. These predictions are sensitive to the types of districts in large part 
because of the fundamentally different way in which the two theories predict voters are 
motivated to select one candidate, and by extension their policy positions, over another. 
The directional model is a stimulus based theory where more intense parties have greater 
effect on voters and are more likely to move them in one direction or another so long as 
they are deemed as responsible. The proximity model assumes that voters are primarily 
concerned with the distance between themselves and the candidate’s position and 
therefore, whether the district was split evenly amongst partisans or slightly favored one 
partisan or another the absolute median position would still place a candidate closest to 
all voter preferences.  
 As reflected in table 34, crosstabulations examine which of the two major theories 
was more reflective of Republican and Democratic consultants in the very districts where 
the theories make different strategy predictions. The column variables are the 
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dichotomous dependant variables from the previous regression models, determining the 
amount of tension consultants feel between catering to their base and seeking the swing 
voter -- the less tension the more directional their position strategy, the more tension they 
feel the more proximity-oriented their strategy. They are asked their view of this tension 
both within their own campaigns and in campaigns in general. The row variables are 
Democratic candidates in slightly Democratic or evenly split districts, and Republican 
candidates in slightly Republican or evenly split districts.  
 
 
Table 34 
Consultants’ perception of the amount of tension in their campaign 
for pleasing the base and swing voter in specified districts by Party 
 
Party 
Amount of Tension in Campaign 
Total None to Little 
Modest to  
Incompatible 
 GOP 79.4% (27) 20.6%   (7) 100.0% (34) 
 Dem 57.9% (22) 42.1% (16) 100.0% (38) 
Total 68.1% (49) 31.9% (23) 100.0% (72) 
       Chi Square = 3.822, df = 1, p = .051 
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Table 35 
Consultants’ perception of the amount of tension in general  
for pleasing the base and swing voter in specified districts by party 
  
  
 Party 
Amount of Tension in General 
Total None to Little 
Modest to 
Incompatible 
 GOP 58.8% (20) 41.2% (14) 100.0% (34) 
 Dem 26.3% (10) 73.7% (28) 100.0% (38) 
 Total 41.7% (30) 58.3% (42) 100.0% (72) 
                Chi Square = 7.802, df = 1, p = .005 
 
 From the results above (Tables 34 and 35), it is clear that there does appear to be a 
difference in how consultants for Democrats and Republicans positions themselves on 
issues in the two key district types focused on in the directional and proximity theories. 
When asked about their own campaigns, Republican and Democratic consultants appear 
to be fairly directional in their approach to positioning. However, when asked about 
campaigns in general, Democratic consultants appear to position themselves more along 
the lines of the proximity model.  
 What is compelling about these results are that not only does there appear to be 
confirmation of the earlier analysis that there is an actual difference in how consultants 
from both parties envision campaign position strategy, but that there is a demonstrable 
difference between their ideal in positioning and their actual behavior in their own 
campaigns. In order to test to see if there is any statistically significant difference 
between the Republican and Democratic consultants’ responses to their perception of 
tension, a t-test was performed to see if these differences were significant. The results 
suggest that there is a very real difference in how these two parties are viewing their 
positioning strategy.  
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Table 36 
Consultants’ perception of the amount of tension for pleasing the base and swing voter 
In specified districts by campaign type 
 
Consultants’ Perception of 
Tension Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Their Campaign .3194 72 .46953 .05534 
Campaigns in General .5833 72 .49647 .05851 
 t = -4.024, df = 71, p = .000 
 
 
 The results above show that consultants for both parties perceive significantly 
more tension in campaigns in general than in their own campaigns for the two crucial 
district types focused on by the directional and proximity theories. However, given that 
we have already seen a difference in the level of tension between parties, and there is a 
difference in tension between the general and the specific campaign it leads to our next 
two tests. Is there a statistically significant difference within parties based on position 
theories in general or in their specific campaigns?  
 
Table 37 
Republican consultants’ perception of the amount of tension for pleasing 
 the base and swing voter in specified districts by campaign type 
 
Consultants’ Perception of 
Tension Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Their Campaign .2059 34 .41043 .07039 
Campaigns in General .4118 34 .49955 .08567 
    t = -2.028, df = 33, p = .051 
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Table 38 
Democratic consultants’ perception of the amount of tension for pleasing 
 the base and swing voter in specified districts by campaign type 
 
Consultants’ Perception of 
Tension Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Their Campaign .4211 38 .50036 .08117 
Campaigns in General .7368 38 .44626 .07239 
 t = -3.706, df = 37, p = .001 
 
 
  
The results above (Tables 37 and 38) suggest that there is still a difference in the 
level of tension felt between the general and specific campaigns of consultants, even 
within their own parties.  Republican consultants experience significantly more tension 
when speaking of campaigns in general versus their own campaigns (.412 and .201 
respectively).  Democrats showed a similar pattern of significantly more perceived 
tension for campaigns in general than their own campaigns (.736 and .421 respectively). 
However, Democratic consultants rated the tension for campaigns in general much higher 
than Republican consultants (.736 compared to .412). 
The larger story being told by the tests above and the preceding tables is twofold.  
First, that when the directional and proximity theories predict a different positioning  
strategy, both Republican and Democratic consultants tend to operate as if the  
directional model holds sway. Second, in all situations Republican consultants were more  
inclined to please their base than Democrats. 
   
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The results of this research will be discussed as follows: for each of the three 
major research areas, candidate traits, negative advertising, and candidate positioning 
there is a discussion of the significant results, as well as the implications of the results for 
our current understanding of political consultants and campaigns in general.  A 
discussion of improvements that could be made on this research will also be discussed 
and finally an analysis of the long term implications of this dissertation.  
Candidate Traits  
The analysis of consultant’s ratings of candidate traits suggest that there are some 
key elements in the campaign environment that have an impact on how political 
consultants view the importance of candidate traits, although in many cases they were not 
necessarily the predictors assumed by current research.  
The results find support for hypotheses 1 (predicting a relationship between the 
consultants’ party and the importance of candidate traits). Generally political consultants 
found similar traits to be important in candidates, but Republican and Democratic 
candidates differed in the importance they placed on the experience a candidate had prior 
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to running for office and their ability to communicate. What is significant in many 
respects about the differences between Republican and Democratic consultants is that the 
traits deemed important were fairly similar between the parties but they differed in 
ranking.  
The results also found support for hypothesis 2 (predicting consultants’ beliefs 
about a relationship between how candidates campaign and govern).  Political consultants 
did find a link between how a candidate runs a campaign and how they will eventually 
govern. This comports with existing literature in Thurber’s research that shows 
consultants do often care about the behavior of their clients as elected officials but also 
has a larger implication for campaign research in general.  
Hypothesis 3,  predicting relationships between the consultants’ ratings of the 
importance of the five traits and predictors from the literature (type of race; race and 
gender of the candidate; party and party preference in the district; education and minority 
percentage in the district; whether the candidate was running for an executive or 
legislative position; whether the candidate had more money than his/her opponent; 
whether the candidate won or lost.), was given some support by the results. While all 
candidate traits were deemed important by most consultants in the sample, their 
determination of the most important traits often did not have a statistically significant 
relationship with established predictors from the literature. According to political 
consultants in this sample, many of the predictors that voters and by extension political 
science has employed to determine the importance of candidate traits do not weigh 
heavily on political consultant’s evaluation of candidate traits. Almost all of the inherent 
traits that current political science literature suggests are significant in evaluating 
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candidate traits were not deemed important by consultants in this sample in favor of more 
contextual variables. Predictors such as the race, gender or even the partisan 
identification of the candidate and district meant little to consultants as they found the 
specifics of the campaign context to have a stronger grip on their evaluations. The 
amount of money the campaign had to spend, and the number of minorities in the district 
seemed to matter most in what traits were important in a candidate while running for 
office or even governing. So, according to consultants while there may be some universal 
traits such as honesty and integrity that they consider to be the best traits of a candidate, 
when in the midst of the campaign what they deem important will ultimately be 
determined by what resources they have at their disposal to promote the candidate’s traits 
and how the local population’s unique needs might be met by such traits.  
Overall, it would appear that consultants have preferences in candidates, and see a 
relationship between the campaigns they work on and what victorious officials will do 
once in office. However, it is also clear that consultants appear to be contextually driven 
when it comes to evaluating candidates, they are concerned with what the local 
constituency desires, and then alter their campaign (with resources they have available) to 
cater to that constituency. This should give heart to those concerned about a potential 
disconnect between political professionals and the voters they are working to engage. If 
anything these results might suggest that consultants are totally beholden to campaign 
context and lack any overarching thoughts on candidates.  
Negative Advertising  
 The analysis of consultants’ use of negative advertising suggests that there is 
some support for the hypothesis that political consultants will have a more consistent 
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definition of negative advertising (hypothesis 1). Political consultants in the sample 
described negative advertising in various ways, and in some cases provided fairly 
consistent beliefs about what negative advertising entails which is helpful for future 
analysis of the subject. Political scientists hoping to study negative advertising in the 
future should consider more input from political consultants given that they are not only 
actively involved in the development of many ‘negative’ ads, but also they may provide 
heretofore under examined views on the definition of ‘negative’. 
 Consultants in general drew sharp distinctions between ‘going negative’ and 
‘attacking’ in ads, something that is occasionally captured in current political science 
discussions of negative advertising definitions but not with consistency. In general, 
consultants in the sample were fairly adamant about the fact that outright lying in 
campaign attacks was wrong. Also, while a candidate’s professional life was open to any 
criticism, when it came to a candidate’s personal life, more consultants expressed that 
personal issues were reasonable in negative ads if they had some clear relevance to the 
position being sought or policy issues at play in the campaign. Which stands to reason; a 
political opponent’s extra-martial affair and subsequent divorce may have no real bearing 
on their ability to be State Attorney General, unless their campaign is predicated on a 
theme of family values and integrity, in which case personal foibles become legitimate 
political questions. The results from this analysis do provide enough information to create 
what might be a consistent definition of negative advertising that is useful and actually 
applicable to many areas for future political science research:  
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“Negative advertising is defined as any ads or messages directed at one’s 
opponent during the campaign that are either untrue, or related to personal 
issues that do not have some obvious relevance to the position they are seeking.”  
 The multivariate analyses showed that the most consistent and powerful 
predictors for the use of attack advertising either on policy or character by political 
consultants are the poll numbers during the campaign (hypothesis 2). While those seeking 
executive positions are slightly more likely to attack than those seeking legislative 
positions (hypotheses 3), and Democrats appear to be more policy oriented in their 
attacks than Republican candidates (hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 6), it is the campaign 
context, the political polls that drive when and on what themes consultants chose to 
attack. However, no significant relationship was found between the use of negative attack 
ads and the type of race (challenger, open seat, incumbent) (hypothesis 5) 
 Character attacks are less frequent but seem to elicit more concerns from 
consultants than policy attacks, and thus are more driven by poll numbers in all 
situations. This suggests that in a perfect campaign world the only issues worth attacking 
one’s opponent on would be their voting record and policy initiatives, but when the 
stakes are high and loss might be imminent, in the mind of political consultants, there 
may be no better way to bring down the opposition than to throw as much mud as 
possible and hope that something brings down their lead.  
  What is interesting also about these results is that again, contextual 
variables tend to have more weight in general than inherent variables. A candidate’s 
position in the polls, and what position they are seeking tend to weigh more, at least in 
the realm of policy attacks, than whether they are a challenger, incumbent or in an open 
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seat race. Partisan identification related to policy attacks, and not at all to character which 
made sense given the penchant for consultants to not want to admit that they attacked on 
anything other than policy in the survey. Finally these results suggest again that context is 
the key to determining consultant behavior, when the types of attacks that a campaign is 
subjected to are controlled for the results show that various aspects of the campaign 
environment become more important, from the positions being sought to even what polls 
matter. It is becoming more and more clear that while consultants have general ideas 
about how campaigns work, the world that they live and theorize in is moved by the 
whims of the voters and campaign peculiarities rather than overarching themes.  
Candidate Position  
 This section began with a discussion of issue ownership, where issue ownership 
was looked at through the prism of consultants should be more reluctant to alter issue 
positions on issues that their party  ‘owned’. Hypothesis 3 (predicting party differences in 
tension for changing position) was supported but only weakly. The results did not suggest 
that there was a clear split between issue ownership for Republican and Democratic 
consultants, although the results did provide some evidence that changing policy 
positions while resisted by both parties was resisted on some issues more than others by 
the two party consultants. In every category, from Foreign affairs to Education, 
consultants who were working for Republican candidates or consultants that were 
working in Republican leaning districts stated that it was problematic to change their 
issue stances. In no category did being a Democratic consultant or working in a 
Democratic leaning district have any impact on concerns about issue ownership.  
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 There was some support for all three hypotheses regarding consultant attitudes on 
candidate positioning. The results suggest that the directional model is more reflective of 
at least consultants for Republican candidates (hypothesis 1).  Consultants working for 
Democrats appear to see much more tension between pleasing their base and the swing 
voter.  
In the subsection of research focusing solely on those districts in which the 
directional and proximity models predict different strategies for success with voters again 
there appeared to be a general tendency towards the directional model amongst 
consultants in this sample. When asked about the tension between catering to their base 
and seeking the centrist voter in the abstract, Republicans appeared to be more directional 
in their position strategy and the proximity model seemed more reflective of Democratic 
consultant strategy. However, when asked about the tension in their own campaigns, 
consultants for both parties appeared to be much more directional in their strategy 
although Republicans were moreso than Democratic consultants.  
In all three questions regarding candidate positioning Democrats seemed to have 
the most difficulty reconciling a need for swing voters and their base, and Republicans 
were much less concerned. There are several potential reasons for this, particularly in the 
minds of political consultants. Democrats by and large have more trouble in getting out 
their voters than Republicans, so perhaps they must consistently seek out swing voters to 
shore up what might be an unreliable base. Moreover, the ideological range of Democrats 
in Congress and throughout the United States is wider, and thus a pro-life Democrat in 
Texas may have trouble galvanizing their base whereas Republican candidates remain 
more ideologically consistent throughout the United States.  
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 When determining what factors influenced which of these models were more 
reflective of consultant beliefs, again the campaign context became significant. While 
Democrats did tend to lean more towards the proximity model, the number of minorities 
in a district, and the partisan leanings of the district weighed heavily on how a consultant 
chose to position their candidate in the regression models. Consultants in districts with 
high minority populations and that leaned Republican reported less tension between 
pleasing the base and seeking the swing voter. This comports with the previous parts of 
this analysis. In districts with a large minority voting population, one can potentially 
galvanize this group and win elections with a plurality without having to win many swing 
voters. In the general models, the Republican consultants were less concerned about 
constituent tension than Democrats and thus it stands to reason that GOP leaning districts 
were places that consultants were less likely to see tension. Again, the campaign context 
reigns supreme in the determination of consultant attitudes.  
   
Conclusions and Future Research 
 This dissertation has explored the attitudes and beliefs of political consultants, and 
suggests that those attitudes and beliefs may have some relevance to the existing political 
science literature. It has been surmised that political consultants do have statistically 
significant and measurable beliefs about candidate traits, negative advertising and 
positioning strategy during a campaign, a result that, prior to this research, may have 
been assumed but had seldom been assessed. Data on consultant attitudes could 
potentially add value to studies of campaign politics above and beyond the three major 
issues discussed in this dissertation. Message formation, turnout strategy and even policy 
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formation studies that form a part of political science work on campaigns could all be 
enhanced by introducing the role and attitudes of political consultants.  Further, while this 
work was limited in the number of campaign years covered in the survey responses, 
future work could potentially compare consultant attitudes towards strategy across 
campaign years, or across different types of campaigns, Congressional, Presidential, and 
state-wide, and determine if there are any overarching themes when the focus of the 
analysis is more specific. In addition, there is a potential predictive value to the analysis 
of consultants for future campaigns, it is clear that many of the results in this analysis 
overlap well with current strategies being employed by the two major presidential 
candidates in 2008, perhaps with a larger data set, predictors of future campaign behavior 
could be estimated.  
This analysis has also shown that consultant’s attitudes are often the result of their 
unique campaign environment, and that there may be consistency in attitudes within 
certain circumstances but not across campaign circumstances. Although beyond the scope 
of this particular analysis, this work does not establish the ‘theory of political consultants’ 
called for by Thurber and Johnson / Cartee-Copeland, however this work, and the results 
from it might begin to move the discipline in that direction. If consultant strategy is 
moved by circumstance and less on general principle the discovery of consistent overall 
theory might be a daunting task indeed. However, at this point we can at least begin to 
understand that consultants do have unique ideas and beliefs and the long term 
implications of these are just beginning to be understood, which leaves the study of 
political consultants in an excellent place for future work.  
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Appendix 
   
 
 
I.  Logistic Regression Models for “Candidate Traits” 
 
Table A 
Importance of Integrity While Running 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
Predictors B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM) 
-.541 .310 3.057 1 .080 .582 
Win/Lose  
-.488 .381 1.638 1 .201 .614 
War Chest District 
-.442 .205 4.650 1 .031 .643 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
-.034 .310 .012 1 .912 .966 
Race of Candidate 
.239 .218 1.196 1 .274 1.270 
Sex of Candidate 
.357 .333 1.145 1 .285 1.428 
Minority Percentage 
.233 .135 2.975 1 .085 1.262 
Education Level District 
.041 .153 .072 1 .789 1.042 
Party Preference District 
.037 .104 .128 1 .720 1.038 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
-.523 .439 1.417 1 .234 .593 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
-.206 .369 .312 1 .576 .814 
Constant 
.971 1.240 .613 1 .434 2.639 
 
 
Table B 
Importance of Integrity while Governing 
 Variables in the Equation  
 
Predictors B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM) 
-.402 .339 1.409 1 .235 .669 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
-.172 .328 .276 1 .600 .842 
Race of Candidate 
.142 .238 .358 1 .550 1.153 
Sex of Candidate 
.325 .343 .897 1 .344 1.383 
Minority Percentage 
.050 .146 .119 1 .730 1.051 
Party Preference District 
-.139 .111 1.559 1 .212 .870 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
.002 .460 .000 1 .996 1.002 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
.052 .385 .018 1 .893 1.053 
Win/Lose 
.135 .403 .113 1 .737 1.145 
War Chest District 
-.164 .208 .623 1 .430 .849 
Education Level District 
.220 .167 1.719 1 .190 1.246 
Constant 
.603 1.299 .215 1 .643 1.827 
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Table C 
Importance of Empathy while Running 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
Predictors B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM) 
.001 .347 .000 1 .999 1.001 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
-.333 .352 .893 1 .345 .717 
Race of Candidate 
.199 .224 .792 1 .373 1.221 
Sex of Candidate 
-.795 .356 4.994 1 .025 .452 
Minority Percentage 
.313 .148 4.498 1 .034 1.368 
Education Level District 
.371 .174 4.561 1 .033 1.450 
Party Preference District 
-.015 .117 .016 1 .898 .985 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
.688 .448 2.354 1 .125 1.989 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
.211 .408 .268 1 .605 1.235 
Win/Lose 
-.523 .384 1.858 1 .173 .593 
Constant 
-1.702 1.112 2.342 1 .126 .182 
 
 
 
 
Table D 
Importance of Empathy while Governing 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM) 
.537 .340 2.499 1 .114 1.711 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
-.085 .337 .064 1 .800 .918 
Race of Candidate 
.395 .223 3.124 1 .077 1.484 
Sex of Candidate 
-.117 .354 .110 1 .740 .889 
Minority Percentage 
.183 .142 1.667 1 .197 1.201 
Education Level District 
.103 .163 .398 1 .528 1.108 
Party Preference District 
.080 .115 .488 1 .485 1.084 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
.292 .465 .396 1 .529 1.340 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
-.552 .407 1.838 1 .175 .576 
Win/Lose 
-1.106 .414 7.125 1 .008 .331 
 War Chest District 
-.378 .217 3.036 1 .081 .685 
Constant 
-.032 1.299 .001 1 .980 .968 
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Table E 
Importance of Leadership while Running 
Variables in the Equation 
 
Predictors B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM)  
-.119 .318 .140 1 .709 .888 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
-.083 .321 .066 1 .797 .921 
Race of Candidate 
.137 .213 .410 1 .522 1.146 
Sex of Candidate 
.343 .348 .968 1 .325 1.409 
Minority Percentage 
.428 .140 9.409 1 .002 1.534 
Party Preference District 
-.037 .106 .120 1 .729 .964 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
-.445 .457 .947 1 .331 .641 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
-.341 .385 .783 1 .376 .711 
Win/Lose 
-.402 .391 1.056 1 .304 .669 
War Chest Dist 
-.664 .214 9.674 1 .002 .515 
Educational Level District 
.192 .159 1.448 1 .229 1.211 
Constant 
.207 1.269 .027 1 .871 1.230 
 
 
 
 
Table F 
Importance of Leadership while Governing 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM)  
-.359 .322 1.247 1 .264 .698 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
.167 .326 .262 1 .609 1.182 
Race of Candidate 
.183 .236 .603 1 .437 1.201 
Sex of Candidate 
.131 .340 .148 1 .700 1.140 
Minority Percentage 
.275 .143 3.721 1 .054 1.316 
Party Preference District 
-.081 .106 .584 1 .445 .922 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
.177 .449 .156 1 .693 1.194 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
.296 .381 .603 1 .437 1.344 
Win/Lose 
.040 .389 .011 1 .918 1.041 
War Chest Dist 
-.032 .204 .024 1 .876 .969 
Educational Level District 
.159 .160 .990 1 .320 1.173 
Constant 
-.792 1.266 .391 1 .532 .453 
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Table G 
Importance of Ambition while Running 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
Predictors B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM)  
-.064 .320 .039 1 .843 .938 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
-.099 .325 .093 1 .761 .906 
Race of Candidate 
.219 .212 1.064 1 .302 1.245 
Sex of Candidate 
.271 .355 .584 1 .445 1.312 
Minority Percentage 
.077 .137 .319 1 .572 1.080 
Party Preference District 
.031 .108 .083 1 .773 1.032 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
.397 .458 .753 1 .386 1.487 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
.616 .389 2.504 1 .114 1.852 
Win/Lose 
.772 .401 3.711 1 .054 2.163 
War Chest Dist 
.353 .212 2.764 1 .096 1.423 
Educational Level District 
.377 .161 5.520 1 .019 1.458 
Constant 
-4.543 1.347 11.382 1 .001 .011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table H 
Importance of Ambition while Governing 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM)  
-.158 .364 .188 1 .665 .854 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
-.043 .370 .013 1 .908 .958 
Race of Candidate 
-.043 .256 .028 1 .868 .958 
Sex of Candidate 
-.230 .388 .352 1 .553 .794 
Minority Percentage 
.179 .156 1.323 1 .250 1.196 
Party Preference District 
.037 .123 .089 1 .765 1.038 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
.101 .503 .040 1 .841 1.107 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
-.122 .431 .080 1 .777 .885 
Win/Lose 
.116 .453 .065 1 .798 1.123 
War Chest District 
.227 .234 .940 1 .332 1.255 
Educational Level District 
.010 .181 .003 1 .956 1.010 
Constant 
-2.131 1.459 2.133 1 .144 .119 
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Table I 
Importance of Competence while Running 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
Predictors B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM)  
.106 .316 .112 1 .738 1.112 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
-.282 .322 .767 1 .381 .754 
Race of Candidate 
.349 .213 2.681 1 .102 1.418 
Sex of Candidate 
.279 .348 .644 1 .422 1.322 
Minority Percentage 
.252 .135 3.506 1 .061 1.287 
Party Preference District 
-.070 .108 .421 1 .517 .932 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
-.325 .446 .530 1 .467 .723 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
-.113 .378 .090 1 .765 .893 
Win/Lose 
-.320 .385 .689 1 .407 .726 
War Chest District 
-.222 .207 1.147 1 .284 .801 
Educational Level District 
-.035 .158 .049 1 .824 .966 
Constant 
-.113 1.254 .008 1 .929 .894 
 
 
 
 
Table J 
Importance of Competence while Governing 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
Predictors B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM)  
.084 .314 .072 1 .789 1.088 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
-.133 .317 .177 1 .674 .875 
Race of Candidate 
.106 .222 .229 1 .632 1.112 
Sex of Candidate 
.355 .335 1.125 1 .289 1.427 
Minority Percentage 
-.090 .137 .432 1 .511 .914 
Party Preference District 
-.200 .106 3.544 1 .060 .819 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
.108 .438 .061 1 .805 1.114 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
.469 .375 1.560 1 .212 1.598 
Win/Lose 
-.118 .386 .093 1 .761 .889 
War Chest District 
-.188 .201 .882 1 .348 .828 
Educational Level District 
.023 .156 .021 1 .884 1.023 
Constant 1.327 1.246 1.134 1 .287 3.770 
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II.  Logistic Regression Models for “Changing Policy Stance” 
 
 
Table K 
How problematic would it be to change policy position on Foreign Policy 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
Predictors B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM) 
-1.251 .373 11.218 1 .001 .286 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
.579 .539 1.153 1 .283 1.784 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
-.321 .493 .423 1 .516 .726 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
.124 .401 .096 1 .757 1.132 
Party Preference (District) 
-.054 .118 .208 1 .649 .948 
Win/Lose 
.075 .512 .021 1 .884 1.078 
Polls Midway 
.022 .176 .016 1 .900 1.022 
Constant 
-.533 1.388 .147 1 .701 .587 
 
 
Table L 
How problematic would it be to change policy position on Jobs 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
Predictors B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM) 
-.238 .344 .480 1 .489 .788 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
.500 .493 1.029 1 .310 1.648 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
.454 .428 1.120 1 .290 1.574 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
-.225 .366 .379 1 .538 .798 
Party Preference (District) 
-.235 .110 4.591 1 .032 .791 
Win/Lose 
.029 .466 .004 1 .950 1.030 
Polls Midway 
.198 .161 1.515 1 .218 1.219 
Constant 
-.421 1.238 .116 1 .734 .656 
 
 
Table M 
How problematic would it be to change policy position on Education 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
Predictors B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM) 
-.507 .376 1.813 1 .178 .602 
Challenger vs Incumbent 1.231 .546 5.083 1 .024 3.423 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
.807 .488 2.733 1 .098 2.242 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
.242 .385 .393 1 .531 1.274 
Party Preference (District) 
-.233 .121 3.725 1 .054 .792 
Win/Lose 
.019 .496 .001 1 .970 1.019 
Polls Midway 
.120 .175 .472 1 .492 1.127 
Constant 
-1.534 1.347 1.296 1 .255 .216 
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Table N 
How problematic would it be to change policy position on Taxes 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
Predictors B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM) 
-.939 .365 6.628 1 .010 .391 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
.779 .512 2.322 1 .128 2.180 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
.489 .440 1.231 1 .267 1.630 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
.224 .378 .353 1 .553 1.252 
Party Preference (District) 
.008 .110 .005 1 .945 1.008 
Win/Lose 
-.527 .485 1.178 1 .278 .591 
Polls Midway 
-.018 .163 .013 1 .911 .982 
Constant 1.184 1.277 .859 1 .354 3.266 
 
 
 
Table O 
How problematic would it be to change policy position on Social and Cultural Issues 
 Variables in the Equation 
 
Predictors B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Party (GOP/DEM) 
-.759 .339 5.005 1 .025 .468 
Challenger vs Incumbent 
.429 .483 .789 1 .374 1.535 
Open Seat vs Incumbent 
.183 .421 .188 1 .664 1.201 
Position Sought (Executive/Legislative) 
.205 .357 .331 1 .565 1.228 
Party Preference (District) 
.021 .106 .037 1 .847 1.021 
Win/Lose 
-.121 .456 .070 1 .791 .886 
Polls Midway 
.242 .158 2.353 1 .125 1.273 
Constant 
-.888 1.225 .525 1 .469 .412 
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III. Position Strategy when in Different Partisan Preference Type Districts 
 
 
Table P 
GOP candidate position strategy (directional or proximity) 
when in different partisan preference type districts. 
  
Partisan Preference Type Districts 
Proximity 
% (N) 
Directional 
% (N) 
Total 
% (N) 
Very Democratic with GOP candidate 52.9% (9) 47.1%  (8) 100% (17) 
Slightly Democratic with GOP candidate 42.9% (3)  57.1%  (4) 100.0% (7) 
About evenly split with GOP candidate  30.0% (3) 70.0%  (7) 100.0% (10) 
Slightly Republican with GOP candidate 40.9% (9) 59.1% (13) 100.0% (22) 
Very Republican with GOP candidate  33.3% (6) 66.7% (12) 100.0% (18) 
Total 40.5% (30) 59.5% (44) 100.0% (74) 
 Chi-square = 1.950, df= 4, p< = .745 
 
 
 
Table Q 
Democratic candidate position strategy (directional or proximity) 
when in different partisan preference type districts. 
 
Partisan Preference Type Districts 
Proximity 
% (N) 
Directional 
 % (N) 
Total  
% (N) 
Very Democratic with Dem Candidate 41.0% (16)  59.0% (23) 100.0% (39) 
Slightly Democratic With Dem Candidate  79.2% (19)  20.8% (5)  100.0% (24) 
About Even with Dem Candidate  54.5% (6)  45.5% (5)  100.0% (11) 
Slightly GOP with Dem Candidate  52.0% (13)  48.0% (12)  100.0% (25) 
Very GOP with Dem Candidate  52.9% (9)  47.1% (8)  100.0% (17) 
Total  54.3% (63) 45.7% (53) 100.0% (116) 
Chi-square = 1.816, df= 4, p< = .066 
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Table R 
Democratic candidate position strategy (cater-to-base vs seek-the-center) 
when in different partisan preference type districts. 
 
Partisan Preference Type Districts 
Seek the 
Centrist Voter 
% (N) 
Cater to the 
Base 
% (N) 
Total 
% (N) 
Very Democratic with Dem Candidate 28.9% (11) 71.1% (27) 100.0% (38) 
Slightly Democratic With Dem Candidate 71.4% (15) 28.6% (6) 100.0% (21) 
About Even with Dem Candidate  88.9% (8) 11.1% (1) 100.0% (9) 
Slightly GOP with Dem Candidate 90.5% (19)  9.5% (2) 100.0% (21) 
Very GOP with Dem Candidate 70.6% (12) 29.4% (5) 100.0% (17) 
 Total 61.3% (65) 38.7% (41) 100.0% (106) 
 Chi-square = 28.721, df= 4, p< = .000 
 
 
 
Table S 
GOP candidate position strategy (cater-to-base vs seek-the-center) 
when in different partisan preference type districts. 
 
Partisan Preference Type Districts 
Seek the 
Centrist Voter 
% (N) 
Cater to the 
Base 
% (N) 
Total  
% (N) 
Very Democratic with GOP candidate 55.0% (11) 45.0% (9) 100%  (20) 
Slightly Democratic with GOP candidate  50.0% (3) 50.0% (3) 100%   (6) 
About Evenly Split with GOP candidate 37.5% (3) 62.5% (5) 100%   (8) 
Slightly Republican with GOP candidate 23.5% (4) 76.5% (13) 100% (17) 
Very Republican with GOP candidate 25.0% (3) 75.0% (9) 100% (12) 
 Total 38.1% (24) 61.9% (39) 100% (63) 
 Chi-square = 5.187, df= 4, p< = .269 
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IV.  Political Consultant Survey 
 
A. Questionnaire 
 
This survey is a critical part of dissertation research on political consultants. The purpose 
of this research is to compare and contrast how political consultants think and operate in 
the field with what most political science theory says about how elections are won. The 
results of this research will also really help the general public understand better what 
political consultants do and how their work is not only important but essential to how 
elections work in the United States today.  
 
You are one of about 250 participants in this survey. The survey has 10 sections and 
should take about 30 minutes, however you do not have to complete the entire survey in 
one sitting. Just leave the survey open on your screen until you are finished. We ask that 
you complete the survey within 1 week of activating the link through your email. 
Questions marked with an asterisk must be answered in order to continue with the survey, 
questions without an asterisk  are optional.  
 
The entire process is voluntary and you have the right to stop at any point. This survey 
program guarantees your privacy and there is no way that answers can be traced back to 
any individual survey respondent. If you have any questions or concerns feel free to 
contact the primary investigator. Thank you for your time. 
 
Jason Johnson 
Phd Candidate in Political Science 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Dissertation Fellow, Hiram College  
330-569-7887 
johnsonja@hiram.edu 
  
   
Q1. Do you agree with / understand the terms written above? 
Yes  
No   
 
Q2. Some questions on this survey ask about specific campaigns that you have worked on, others ask  
about your general views. When answering survey questions about specific campaigns please answer in 
terms of one or two important campaigns that you have worked on in your career, even if you are a  
general consultant. Also, complete the survey based COMPLETED campaigns, not ones you are currently  
working on. With that in mind, in what year did you work on the campaign that you will refer to most often 
in this survey? 
2004  
2002  
2000  
1998  
1996  
1994  
Other (please specify)  
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Q3. What was your campaign position during the election? 
Manager  
Fundraiser  
Media  
GOTV  
Other (please specify)  
  
Q4. How long have you worked as a consultant or campaign organizer? 
1-4 years  
5-10 years  
11-15 years  
16-20 years  
More than 20 years  
  
Q5. What is your level of education? 
High school diploma  
Associates Degree or certificate  
Bachelor's Degree  
Masters Degree  
PhD  
Professional Degree  
   
Q6. What was your candidate's Party Identification? 
Republican    
Democrat    
Independent     
Other (please specify)    
    
Q7. What were the genders of the candidates running? 
 Male Female  
My candidate was    
The opposition's candidate was    
    
Q8. Your candidate was:   
White    
Black    
Hispanic    
Asian    
Other (please specify)    
    
Q9. Your opponent was:    
White    
Black    
Hispanic    
Asian    
Other (please specify)    
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Q10. Your candidate's position at the beginning of the race was: 
Incumbent    
Challenger    
It was an open seat race    
    
Q11. Which of the following best describes the position sought by your candidate? 
President    
Governor    
Federal Senate    
Federal House    
State Legislature    
Mayor/City Manager    
School Board    
Other (please specify)    
    
Q12. Did your candidate win the general election? 
Yes    
No    
    
Q13. In what region of the country was the campaign you were involved in taking place? 
Northeast     
Mid-Atlantic    
Southeast    
South    
Midwest    
Southwest    
West    
Pacific Northwest     
    
Q14. Immediately after the primaries took place your candidate was:   
Ahead of their opponent in the polls by double digits    
Ahead of their opponent in the polls by single digits    
About even with their opponent    
Behind their opponent in the polls by single digits    
Behind their opponent in the polls by double digits    
    
Q15. Midway through the campaign your candidate was: 
Ahead of their opponent in the polls by double digits    
Ahead of their opponent in the polls by single digits    
About even with their opponent     
Behind their opponent by single digits    
Behind their opponent in the polls by double digits    
    
Q16. At the end of the campaign your candidate:  
Won by double digits    
Won by single digits    
Had a runoff election    
Lost by single digits    
Lost by double digits    
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Q17. Which of the following best describes the region you campaigned in? 
Mostly rural    
Somewhat rural    
Mixed rural and urban area    
Suburban    
Urban    
    
Q18. Which of the following best describes the minority demographics of your campaign region? 
Less than 10%     
between 10 and 25%    
between 26-40%    
between 41-55%    
Over 55%    
 
Q19. What was the largest ethnic or racial minority in your campaign area? 
African American    
Asian American    
Latino American    
Other (please specify)    
    
Q20. On average about 84% of Americans graduate from high school, 26% have a college degree and  
around 15% have graduate or professional degrees. Which of the following do you think best describes the  
education level of voters in your campaign area?   
Far above average     
Above average     
Average    
Below Average     
Far below average     
    
Q21. The median household income across the United States is about $45,000 a year. Which of the 
following would you say best describes the average income in the area where you campaigned? 
Far above average    
Above average     
Average    
Below average    
Far below average    
    
Q22. What was the general party preference in your campaign area?  
Overwhelmingly Democratic    
Slightly Democratic    
About evenly split between Republicans and Democrats  
Slightly Republican     
Overwhelmingly Republican     
    
Q23. At the beginning of the general election which candidate had more money in their campaign 
war chest? 
Your candidate       
Your opponent       
 131
 
Q24. What was the turnout of eligible voters in your campaign area in the election? 
Less than 35%      
36-45%      
46-55%      
56-65%      
Over 65%       
      
Q25. In planning a campaign strategy some consultants feel there is a clear tension between developing a 
strategy that pleases the base and one that can win over the swing voter. Others feel that these goals are 
entirely compatible. In general how much tension do you feel there is in developing a strategy that pleases 
the base and developing a strategy to win over the swing voter?  
No tension, these goals are entirely compatible      
Little tension, trade-offs exist, but by and large the goals are compatible    
Modest tension, clear trade-offs exist, but they are not severe    
High tension, strong trade-offs exist      
Incompatible, if one pleases the base, one alienates swing voters    
 
      
Q26. Now consider your campaign. How much tension did you feel there was between pleasing the base 
and winning over the swing voter? 
No tension, these goals were entirely compatible      
Little tension, trade-offs existed, but by and large the goals were compatible   
Modest tension, clear trade-offs existed, but they were not severe    
High tension, strong trade-offs existed      
Incompatible, any effort to please the base, alienated swing voters     
 
      
Q27. In your opinion, in general, how effective is the use of negative advertising in winning a political  
campaign? 
Highly effective      
Effective      
Neither effective or ineffective      
Ineffective      
Highly ineffective      
 
      
Q28. Under each of the following circumstances how likely would you be to launch a negative advertising 
campaign against your opponent? 
 
Very 
Likely 
Somewhat 
 Likely 
Neither Likely  
nor Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely Unlikely 
Your candidate is far behind in the election       
Your candidate is slightly behind in the 
election        
Your candidate is even with their opponent      
Your candidate is slightly ahead in the 
election       
Your candidate is way ahead in the election      
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Q29. Some argue that negative advertising has an adverse affect on voter turnout, which of the  
following best describes your opinion on this issue? 
Negative advertising greatly increases turnout 
Negative advertising somewhat increases turnout 
Negative advertising has a neutral impact on turnout 
Negative advertising somewhat decreases turnout 
Negative advertising greatly decreases turnout 
 
Q30. During a heated campaign attack advertising can become harsh. In general how important 
are each of the following in constraining the negative tone of attack ads?  
 
Extremely  
Important 
Somewhat 
 Important 
Neither 
Important 
nor Unimportant 
Somewhat 
 Unimportant  
Extremely 
Unimportant  
Community reaction     
The candidate     
Your standing in the polls      
 
      
Q31. What is your definition of negative advertising?   
      
Q32. Were any negative advertisements run during your campaign? 
Yes, our opponent attacked us first       
Yes, we attacked our opponent first       
No, there were no negative ads run       
      
Q33.  Did any outside groups run attack ads during the campaign? 
Yes, outside groups ran attack ads against my candidate    
Yes, outside groups ran attack ads against my opponent    
Yes, outside groups ran attack ads against my candidate and the opponent   
No, outside groups did not run any attack ads      
 
     
Q34. There are several types of political ads that campaigns run. About how often did you run each of the 
following types of ads? 
 Very Often Often Occasionally Seldom Never 
Attack Advertising      
Comparison Advertising     
Endorsement Advertising     
Positive Bio Advertising     
 
      
Q35. In trying to understand your opponent's strategy, what was their motivation for running attack ads?  
      
Q36. What were the major themes of your opponent’s attack ads against your candidate? 
      
Q37. What were the major themes of your attack ads against your opponent?  
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Q38. In YOUR attack ads, which of the following best describes how often you focused on your opponent’s  
CHARACTER? 
Always       
Mostly      
Sometimes       
Seldom      
Never  
      
Q39. In YOUR attack ads which of the following best describes how often you focused on your opponent’s  
POLICY POSITIONS?  
Always      
Mostly      
Sometimes      
Seldom      
Never       
      
Q40. In your OPPONENT’S attack ads, which of the following best describes how often they focused on  
YOUR candidate’s character? 
Always      
Mostly      
Sometimes      
Seldom      
Never       
      
Q41. In your OPPONENT’S attack ads, which of the following best describes how often they focused on  
YOUR candidate’s policy positions?  
Always      
Mostly      
Sometimes      
Seldom      
Never       
 
Q42. Many consultants argue that attack ads can have differing effects on candidates. Sometimes the ads 
can highlight the negative traits associated with a candidate, sometimes attack ads can diminish the positive 
traits a candidate promotes about themselves. The following questions address this aspect of negative  
advertising. 
 Increased 
Slight  
Increase No Impact 
Slight 
Decrease Decrease 
Positive Rating     
Negative Rating     
      
 
Q43. How did attack ads aimed at your candidate impact the following ratings of your candidate? 
 Increased 
Slight  
Increase No Impact 
Slight  
Decrease Decrease 
Positive Rating     
Negative Rating     
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Q44. In general did your ads use humor?     
Yes, they were mostly humorous    
Yes, some were humorous some serious    
No, they were mostly serious      
No, they were all serious 
      
Q45. In general did your opponent's ads use humor?    
Yes, they were mostly humorous     
Yes, some were humorous some serious     
No, they were mostly serious      
No, they were all serious      
 
Q46. In general do you think that the ads that were run by your opponent against your candidate  
were unfair?  
Yes, virtually all were unfair      
Yes, more were unfair than fair      
They were mixed, about half were fair and half were unfair    
No, More were fair than unfair      
No, virtually all were fair       
      
Q47. In general, do you think that any of the ads that you ran during the campaign against your opponent  
were unfair?  
Yes, virtually all were unfair      
Yes, more were unfair than fair      
They were mixed, about half were fair and half were unfair    
No, More were fair than unfair      
No, virtually all were fair       
      
Q48. What were the top two groups that your campaign targeted? 
      
      
Q49. Defining your opponent is a very critical part of the campaign process. Which of the 
following best characterizes how you tried to define your opponent during the campaign?  
Out of touch      
Incompetent      
Inexperienced      
Corrupt      
Too Old, too long in office       
Other (please specify)      
      
Q50. Which of the following best characterizes how your opponent tried to define YOUR candidate? 
Out of touch      
Incompetent      
Inexperienced      
Corrupt      
Too Old, too long in office      
Other (please specify)      
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Q51. Would you say that your candidate     
Always stayed on message       
Mostly stayed on message      
Frequently was not on message        
Never stayed on message       
      
Q52. When or if your candidate did veer from the campaign's main message what were the usual reasons? 
      
      
Q53. How would you classify the level of political awareness of voters in your campaign area? 
Very aware      
Aware      
Somewhat aware      
Hardly aware      
Not at all aware      
      
      
Q54. Turnout is a key part of any election campaign, in your experience is it easier to suppress or increase  
voter turnout? 
Increase      
Suppress      
      
Q55. About what percent of your job in a campaign is dedicated to voter turnout? 
90%      
70%      
50%      
25%      
Less than 10%      
      
Q56. If there is bad weather on election day which party will be most affected?  
Poor weather has a greater impact on Democratic turnout    
Poor weather has a greater impact on Republican turnout    
Poor weather doesn’t have a greater impact on the turnout for either party    
 
Q57. If you thought it would help your candidate would you engage in legal activities that are known 
to depress turnout? 
Yes      
No      
      
Q58. Have you ever engaged in activities designed to lower turnout of the opposition’s supporters during 
an election? 
Yes 
 No      
 
Q59. Did your opposition engage in any activities designed to lower turnout in favor of YOUR candidate? 
Yes      
No      
      
Q60. Despite a recent uptick during presidential election years American voter turnout is still fairly low.  
Why do you think most Americans don't bother to vote?  
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Q61. Which would you prefer as a consultant?   
A small margin of victory in a race with voter turnout above 55%   
A large margin of victory in a race with voter turnout below 30%    
      
Q62. Which of the following do you think has a greater impact on whether or not citizens come out to vote? 
Structural factors (close election, easy registration, major public issues)   
Psychological factors (civic responsibility, trust of politicians, interest in politics)    
      
Q63. Which of the following best describes the voter registration process in your campaign area? 
Same day registration      
30 Day registration in advance      
Other (please specify)      
      
Q64. In general how helpful are the following tactics in turning out the vote? 
 
Extremely 
Effective Effective 
Neither 
Effective or 
Ineffective Ineffective 
Extremely  
Ineffective 
Door to Door     
Phone calls     
Emails     
Mail reminders      
Rallies     
      
      
Q65. Which of the following best describes the employment or office your candidate held prior to running? 
President        
Governor        
Federal Senate        
Federal House        
State Legislature        
Mayor/City Manager        
School Board        
Other (please specify)        
        
Q66. What would you say was your candidate's best attribute?   
        
        
Q67. How important are the following traits for a candidate running for office? 
 
Very 
 Important Important 
Neither Important 
nor Unimportant 
Somewhat  
Unimportant 
    Very 
 Unimportant 
Integrity     
Leadership     
Empathy     
Competence     
Ambition     
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Q68. How important are the following traits when actually governing and serving as an elected official? 
 
Very 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Neither Important 
nor Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
    Very 
Unimportant 
Integrity     
Leadership     
Empathy     
Competence     
Ambition     
      
      
Q69. How do you think the traits that someone has as a candidate relate to how they will actually govern? 
They have a very strong correlation, they way they run and behave in a campaign says a lot about how they 
     will govern. 
They have no correlation, being a great campaigner says little about how you will actually govern. 
I don’t know, I don’t keep up with candidates after the race is over.  
 
 
Q70. List the top three policy issues your campaign dealt with in order of importance  
     
     
Q71. What was your candidate's position on the most important policy issue you faced in the campaign?  
     
     
Q72. Which of the following best describes your candidate’s position on most issues?  
Conservative     
Slightly conservative       
Moderate     
Slightly liberal     
Liberal     
     
     
Q73. Which of the following best describes how your opposition positioned his or herself on most issues?  
Conservative     
Slightly conservative       
Moderate     
Slightly liberal     
Liberal     
     
     
Q74. Now think of the campaign through the eyes of the voters, how did your candidate’s positions compare  
to the opposition? 
Much more conservative      
More conservative      
About the same     
More Liberal     
Much more liberal      
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Q75. Occasionally candidates adjust policy stances during the general election campaign. Which of the 
following best describes your candidate? 
Moved markedly to the left     
Moved slightly to the left     
Remained in the same position throughout the campaign   
Moved slightly to the right     
Moved markedly to the right      
     
Q76. What was the main reason why your candidate shifted positions on issues? 
New information was presented that changed our position   
The opposition took a new position and we changed to counter them   
Our stance was unpopular and hurting us in the polls   
My candidate did not shift on any issues     
 
Q77. What was your candidate's strategic motivation on most issue positions? 
To cater to their base      
To seek the centrist 
voter      
      
Q78. If your candidate adjusted policy positions during the campaign which of these policy areas did  
they shift positions on? 
Foreign Policy      
Jobs      
Taxes      
Education Policy      
Social/Cultural Issues      
No policy position 
changes      
Other (please specify)      
 
      
Q79. If a candidate changes positions on issues during a campaign, it can confuse 
voters, or even worse make you look inconsistent. In general, on which of the 
following issues would it be the most problematic for a candidate to change their 
position?  
 
Extremely 
Problematic 
Somewhat 
Problematic 
Neither 
Problematic nor 
Non-Problematic  
Not 
Problematic 
Extremely  
Not Problematic  
Foreign Policy     
Jobs     
Taxes     
Education Policy     
Social / Cultural Issues      
      
Q80. Which is more important in the minds of voters?  
That a candidate have a strong plan and vision for the future   
That a candidate have a strong past record and experience   
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Q81. Which of the following best characterizes your feelings towards the following statement? 
“The general election is a referendum on the incumbent.”  
Strongly agree     
Agree     
Disagree     
Strongly disagree     
     
     
B. Survey Request Email  
 
Dear Campaign Staffer,    
  
Thank you for agreeing to take this survey. My name is Jason Johnson, I'm a Phd candidate in 
Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I'm doing my dissertation 
on political consultants/managers, specifically: I'm comparing what political science theory says 
you're supposed to do to win a campaign with what political consultants actually do in the field.  
What I am looking for are people who have been campaign managers or political organizers. 
Even if your specific title was not 'campaign manager', or if you ran your own political 
campaign, if you worked on a race from beginning to end, such that you knew about how the 
whole campaign worked, this applies to you as well.  I'm interested in respondents at all levels 
and experience, so if you've worked on anything from school board to city council to a  
presidential level campaign I'd appreciate you filling out the survey. 
 
In addition, If you complete the survey yourself feel free to send this link on to anybody that you 
know who fits the criteria. It is a simple link, and the entire internet survey only takes about 30 
minutes to complete. It does not have to be completed in one sitting, just leave the window open. 
My hope is that people will fill out the survey within a week of receiving it so that I can start 
working on my results as soon as possible. Also, it is completely confidential, the program 
prevents me from tracing any individual response to any particular respondent. Here is the link. 
Please click on the link to the survey below, if you have any problems clicking the link simply cut 
and paste it into your url.  http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.asp?u=563791676156 
 
Thank you so much for any help or people that you can send my way for this research (including 
yourself!) and if you or anyone else has any questions feel free to contact me. 
 
Jason Johnson 
Phd candidate in Political Science University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Dissertation Fellow Hiram College  
330-569-5399 EST 
 
 
C. Survey Follow-Up Email  
 
Dear Campaign Staffer,  
  
A questionnaire on political consultants was sent to you on November 15th. If you have already 
filled out this survey thank you very much for your time. If you have not completed the entire 
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survey, please do so by December 18th, so that your answers can be included in survey results. 
The response so far to the survey has been fantastic, but it is critical to this research that as many 
diverse opinions are included as possible, including yours.  
 
As a quick reminder this survey is for PhD research comparing how political science suggests 
you win political campaigns to how consultants actually behave in the field. The results will be 
used in a research project and for academic purposes. If you have already filled out the survey, 
or have not but know of others whom you feel are more qualified to answer the survey please 
feel free to forward this link to them. Thank you for your time, 
  
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.asp?u=563791676156 
  
  
Jason Johnson 
PhD Candidate Political Science 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Dissertation Fellow, Hiram College, Hiram Ohio 
330-569-5399 
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